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BRINGING SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA 
BACK FROM THE BRINK: ENHANCING 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE SCIENTIFIC 
PROCESS IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL 
PACIFIC FISHERIES COMMISSION 
CHRIS WOLD*† 
EMI KONDO** 
ERIKA HAMILTON*** 
Abstract: The Commission of the Convention on the Conservation and Manage-
ment of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western Pacific Ocean, or the 
WCPFC, manages fish stocks of significant financial and ecological value across a 
vast area of the Pacific Ocean. WCPFC members, however, have disagreed sharply 
over management measures for tuna, sharks, and other species. These disagree-
ments have arisen due to ambiguous text in the Convention on the Conservation 
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western Pacific Ocean 
regarding the roles of the Convention’s subsidiary bodies and providers of scien-
tific advice. Some members argue that only the International Scientific Committee 
for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean, or the ISC, and the 
Northern Committee may provide scientific and management advice for those fish 
stocks occurring north of twenty degrees north latitude. Other members, however, 
believe that the Convention’s Scientific Committee has the ultimate responsibility 
to provide advice to the WCPFC for all stocks. These institutional disagreements 
are having profound, adverse impacts on species. This Article concludes that the 
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Convention grants the Scientific Committee the authority to review the assessments 
and other work of the providers of scientific information and make recommenda-
tions to the Commission concerning conservation and management of all stocks in 
the Convention Area. This gives the Scientific Committee the authority and the du-
ty to review the ISC’s scientific advice and recommendations deriving from it. To 
clarify any ambiguity, this Article recommends that the WCPFC revise the rules of 
procedure of the Northern Committee, the memorandum of understanding between 
the WCPFC and the ISC, and the WCPFC’s resolution on best available science. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western Pacific Ocean (the “WCPF Convention” or the “Con-
vention”)1 establishes the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(the “WCPFC”) to manage and conserve tuna and other fish stocks of significant 
financial2 and ecological value across a huge swath of the Pacific Ocean—an 
area covering about twenty percent of Earth’s surface.3 The WCPFC is one of 
five tuna commissions—known as regional fisheries management organizations 
(“RFMOs”)—that manage fisheries throughout the world’s oceans.4 Despite 
being a relatively new RFMO,5 WCPFC members have already disagreed sharp-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Sept. 5, 2000, 2275 U.N.T.S. 40532 [hereinafter WCPF Conven-
tion] (entered into force June 19, 2004). “WCPF” stands for Western and Central Pacific Fisheries. 
 2 Quentin Hanich et al., Oceans of Opportunity? The Limits of Maritime Claims in the Western 
and Central Pacific Region, in NAVIGATING PACIFIC FISHERIES: LEGAL AND POLICY TRENDS IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES INSTRUMENTS IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL 
PACIFIC REGION 21, 25–26 (Quentin Hanich & Martin Tsamenyi eds., 2009). “[I]n 2007, the tuna 
catch in the [western and central Pacific Ocean] was estimated at 2,396,915 tons and worth approxi-
mately [U.S. $3895] million.” Id. “These tuna fisheries represent the primary economic opportunity 
for many of the region’s small island developing [s]tates.” Id. 
 3 Frequently Asked Questions and Brochures, WCPFC, http://www.wcpfc.int/frequently-asked-
questions-and-brochures (last updated Mar. 3, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/CCT5-6LAR. 
 4 FAQ: What Is a Regional Fishery Management Organization?, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Feb. 
23, 2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2012/02/23/faq-what-is-a-
regional-fishery-management-organization, archived at http://perma.cc/LZW4-DRQF. The other four 
tuna RFMOs are the International Tropical Tuna Commission, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, and the Commission for the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna. Id. Many other RFMOs exist that manage other resources, such as the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries Commission and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources. Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/rfmo/index_en.htm (last updated May 11, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/4N47-NFFC. For general information on the tuna RFMOs, see the European 
Commission website. See id. 
 5 Whereas the WCPF Convention entered into force in 2004, other RFMOs have been in force for 
decades. See, e.g., Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 
1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1982); Convention on Future Mul-
tilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Oct. 24, 1978, 1135 U.N.T.S. 369 (entered 
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ly over management measures for tuna, sharks, and other species, no doubt due 
to the great value of the fisheries resources in the WCPF Convention’s broad 
geographic area. 
The establishment of catch limits for bluefin tuna perhaps best illustrates 
the continuing tensions among WCPFC members.6 In 2012, for example, the 
WCPFC’s Scientific Committee reported that Pacific bluefin tuna “is heavily 
overfished”7 and that its “biomass level is near historically low levels and expe-
riencing high exploitation rates above all biological reference points commonly 
used by fisheries managers.”8 In fact, the most recent stock assessment estimates 
the Pacific bluefin tuna population at just 3.6 percent of historic biomass.9 None-
theless, the Scientific Committee could not reach consensus on management 
advice to provide to the WCPFC. The “majority view” recommended that “fish-
ing mortality on Pacific bluefin tuna be immediately reduced, especially on ju-
veniles, in order to reduce the risk of recruitment collapse and allow the spawn-
ing stock to rebuild.”10 Japan, however, could not support the majority view, 
stating that the Scientific Committee did not have competence to provide advice 
on this species, which is designated as a northern stock subject to advice from 
the WCPFC’s Northern Committee.11 Instead, Japan supported the “minority 
view” endorsed by the International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-
like Species in the North Pacific Ocean (“ISC”), which provides scientific and 
                                                                                                                           
into force Jan. 1, 1979); International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, May 14, 
1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1969); Inter-American Tropical 
Tuna Convention, May 31, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 230 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1950). 
 6 See infra notes 8–17 and accompanying text. 
 7 SCIENTIFIC COMM., WCPFC, SUMMARY REPORT: SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE NINTH REGULAR 
SESSION, § 4.2.2.2, ¶ 194 (2013) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC COMM., NINTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY 
REPORT], available at https://www.wcpfc.int/meetings/9th-regular-session-scientific-committee, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/4U5U-SMZE. 
 8 Id. ¶ 195. 
 9 See SYLVAIN BONHOMMEAU, CIE INDEPENDENT PEER REVIEW REPORT ON THE STOCK AS-
SESSMENT OF PACIFIC BLUEFIN TUNA 23 (2013), available at https://swfsc.noaa.gov/uploadedFiles/
Divisions/DO/2013_06_28%20Bonhommeau%20PBFT%20review%20report.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/6SAH-66UZ (stating that the “[r]esults of the 2012 assessment indicate that the 2010 bio-
mass is near the lowest since 1952 (22,606 mt) and at about 3.6% of the unfished levels”). 
 10 SCIENTIFIC COMM., NINTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 196. 
 11 Id. ¶ 198. Japan specifically stated, 
Given that the current framework of management of the northern stocks[—]namely that 
[the] N[orthern] C[ommittee] formulates the draft [conservation and management 
measures] [“]CMM[s”] based on the conservation advice from [the] ISC[—]is working 
quite well, the recommendations from [the] ISC should be sufficient for the work of the 
[WCPFC]; it is not necessary for [the] S[cientific] C[ommittee] to revise nor restate 
conservation advice made by [the] ISC. This is why Japan supports the advice that 
states [the] S[cientific] C[ommittee] endorsed the conservation advice put forward by 
[the] ISC. 
Id. 
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management advice to the Northern Committee regarding northern stocks.12 In 
contrast to the majority view, which recommended allowing spawning levels to 
rebuild, the ISC called for “strengthening the monitoring of recruitment to com-
prehend the trend of recruitment in a timely manner.”13 A number of other mem-
bers responded to Japan by arguing that the Scientific Committee provides “sci-
entific advice for all WCPFC stocks”14 and “does not exist to simply endorse the 
work of another group.”15 Against this conflicting advice and institutional con-
flict, the WCPFC failed to reduce fishing mortality for Pacific bluefin tuna at its 
December 2013 meeting.16 
These disagreements arise due to the WCPF Convention’s ambiguous text, 
which lacks clarity with respect to the roles of the WCPF Convention’s subsidi-
ary bodies and providers of scientific advice. For example, in advising the 
WCPFC on the management of “northern stocks,”17 some WCPFC members 
argue that the Northern Committee should have sole authority to advise the 
WCPFC,18 whereas others argue that the Scientific Committee also has a role to 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See id.; Memorandum of Understanding, WCPFC-Int’l Scientific Comm. for Tuna & Tuna-like 
Species in the N. Pac. Ocean, Dec. 2005, at pt. I [hereinafter WCPFC-ISC MoU], available at https://
www.wcpfc.int/system/files/0_MOU%20between%20WCPFC%20and%20ISC%20-%20effective.
pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/T45R-9GGB. 
 13 See SCIENTIFIC COMM., NINTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 196. 
 14 Id. ¶ 200 (summarizing the statement of Australia). 
 15 Id. ¶ 201 (summarizing the statement of Papua New Guinea, Palau, and Cook Islands). 
 16 See WCPFC, SUMMARY REPORT: TENTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE CON-
SERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL 
PACIFIC OCEAN, at Agenda Item 4, §§ 4.1 to .2 (2013) [hereinafter WCPFC TENTH REGULAR SESSION 
SUMMARY REPORT], available at https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC%2010%20FINAL
%20RECORD_1.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/5G4X-U33J. Instead, the WCPFC adopted a new 
conservation and management measure (“CMM”) calling for a new management objective to ensure the 
current level of fishing mortality rate “is not increased.” WCPFC, CMM 2013-09, CONSERVATION AND 
MANAGEMENT MEASURE FOR PACIFIC BLUEFIN TUNA ¶ 1 (2013) [hereinafter CMM FOR PACIFIC 
BLUEFIN TUNA], available at https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2013-09/conservation-and-management-
measure-pacific-bluefin-tuna, archived at https://perma.cc/5TRS-7VKH. Conservationists called on the 
WCPFC to reject the Northern Committee’s recommendation, which contained a recommendation that 
the Northern Committee develop a rebuilding plan for Pacific bluefin tuna for adoption at the WCPFC’s 
December 2014 meeting. Id. (noting the Northern Committee’s goal of returning the Pacific bluefin tuna 
population to twenty-five percent of its original population size within the next ten years). 
 17 Northern stocks are stocks found north of twenty degrees north latitude. WCPF Convention, 
supra note 1, art. 11(7). 
 18 See SCIENTIFIC COMM., NINTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 7, § 4.2.2.2. 
Japan, for example, has stated that, 
[T]he recommendations from ISC should be sufficient for the work of the [WCPFC]; it 
is not necessary for [the] S[cientific] C[ommittee] to revise nor restate conservation ad-
vice made by ISC. This is why Japan supports the advice that states [the] S[cientific] 
C[ommittee] endorsed the conservation advice put forward by ISC. 
Id. ¶ 198. 
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play.19 In addition, the WCPFC has agreements with the Secretariat of the Pacif-
ic Community (“SPC”) and the ISC to provide scientific advice and, in the case 
of the SPC, scientific data.20 Again, disagreements exist over the respective roles 
of the ISC, the Northern Committee, and the Scientific Committee to provide 
advice or recommend management measures concerning northern stocks.21 In 
addition, the SPC and the ISC overlap in providing scientific information to the 
subsidiary bodies of the WCPFC.22 For example, both bodies provide advice to 
the WCPFC with respect to Pacific bluefin tuna and blue sharks.23 At times, 
these bodies have provided fundamentally different advice on how to manage 
stocks in the WCPF Convention Area,24 leading to disputes over which body 
should provide advice to the WCPFC and on whose advice the WCPFC must 
rely. 
Despite these disputes and the unusual provisions of the WCPF Conven-
tion, the WCPF Convention is, in fact, clear that the Scientific Committee has 
the authority to review the assessments and other work of the providers of scien-
tific information,25 to review the results of research and analysis on target and 
non-target species,26 and to make recommendations to the WCPFC concerning 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See id. ¶¶ 199–201. Australia, for example, has stated that “the role of [the] S[cientific] 
C[ommittee] (consistent with the Convention and its objective) is to provide scientific advice in re-
spect of Pacific bluefin tuna. Australia’s position is that scientific advice for all WCPFC stocks comes 
from [the] S[cientific] C[ommittee].” Id. ¶ 200. 
 20 See generally WCPFC-ISC MoU, supra note 12 (memorializing an agreement between 
WCPFC and the ISC to provide scientific advice). 
 21 See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 22 See, e.g., N. COMM., WCPFC, SUMMARY REPORT: EIGHTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE 
NORTHERN COMMITTEE ¶ 36 (2012) [hereinafter N. COMM., EIGHTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY 
REPORT], available at https://www.wcpfc.int/meetings/8th-regular-session-northern-committee, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/38AY-XPSG (stating that Japan and the ISC showed concern that the ISC 
and SPC might be performing duplicative work in assessing the status of blue sharks). 
 23 See, e.g., ISC & WCPFC, GN-IP-02, REPORT OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE FOR TUNA AND TUNA-LIKE SPECIES IN THE NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN 
§§ 7.2, 7.6 (2013) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING OF THE ISC] (assessing the 
stock status of Pacific bluefin tuna and blue shark); SPC Scientists Tackle Stock Assessment for Blue 
Sharks in the North Pacific Ocean, SPC OCEANIC FISHERIES PROGRAMME, http://www.spc.int/
oceanfish/en/ofpsection/sam/400-spc-scientists-tackle-stock-assessment-for-blue-sharks-in-the-north-
pacific-ocean (last visited Mar. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ME79-FRPF (describing the 
SPC’s work assessing populations of blue shark); Tuna Fisheries of the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean, SPC OCEANIC FISHERIES PROGRAMME, http://www.spc.int/Oceanfish/en/tuna-fisheries/
overview-tuna-fisheries/170-tuna-fisheries-of-the-western-and-central-pacific-ocean (last visited Mar. 
27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SUY9-KT2C (describing the SPC’s work assessing populations 
of Pacific bluefin and other tuna species). 
 24 See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (describing the Convention Area). 
 25 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(b). 
 26 Id. art. 12(2)(d). Non-target species are those unintentionally caught as part of fishing for tar-
geted species. Threats: Bycatch, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, https://www.worldwildlife.org/threats/
bycatch (last visited Mar. 27, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/LT2C-WUED. 
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conservation and management of all stocks in the Convention Area.27 Thus, alt-
hough the ISC provides information and advice to the Northern Committee,28 
and the Northern Committee submits recommendations to the WCPFC,29 the 
Scientific Committee has the authority and the duty to review the work of the 
ISC and the recommendations of the Northern Committee.30 Given the conten-
tious and political nature of this issue, it is less clear how the WCPFC can defini-
tively resolve it.  
To determine how scientific advice should be provided to the WCPFC, this 
Article assesses the WCPF Convention and other documents establishing the 
WCPFC, its subsidiary bodies, and its relationships with providers of scientific 
information. Part I begins by briefly introducing the WCPF Convention and de-
scribing the basic functions of the WCPFC, its subsidiary bodies, and its provid-
ers of scientific information.31 Part II identifies the legal hierarchies of these in-
stitutions as well as their roles in providing oversight of other Convention bod-
ies.32 It concludes that the Scientific Committee has an important role to play in 
ensuring that the WCPFC receives the best available scientific information and 
reviewing the assessments of the ISC and the recommendations of the Northern 
Committee.33 In light of the ongoing disputes over the Scientific Committee’s 
role, Part III reviews the WCPF Convention’s mechanisms for dispute settle-
ment.34 It also describes how disputes in other conventions have been resolved.35 
Part IV concludes by recommending specific revisions to the Rules of Procedure 
for the Northern Committee, the memorandum of understanding (“MoU”) be-
tween the WCPFC and the ISC, and the WCPFC’s resolution on best available 
science.36 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE WCPF CONVENTION AND THE WCPFC 
The construction of the WCPF Convention was a challenging one, and 
some of the problems identified in this Article originate from this difficult birth. 
The challenges began with the enormous value of this region’s fisheries. Be-
tween 1980 and 2000, the annual harvest of tuna species—including yellowfin, 
                                                                                                                           
 27 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(g). 
 28 WCPFC-ISC MoU, supra note 12, pt. I. 
 29 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(7); WCPFC, COMMISSION-01, RULES OF PROCEDURE, 
at Annex I, ¶ 2 (2004) [hereinafter WCPFC, RULES OF PROCEDURE], available at https://www.wcpfc.
int/doc/commission-01/rules-procedure, archived at https://perma.cc/ZEP4-GE6D. 
 30 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(b). 
 31 See infra notes 37–150 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 151–300 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 151–300 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 301–422 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 301–422 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 423–427 and accompanying text. 
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bluefin, skipjack, bigeye, and albacore—in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean increased from approximately 440,000 tonnes to 1.8 million tonnes.37 The 
landed value of this tuna (as opposed to the retail value) is estimated at roughly 
$3.8 billion per year.38 
Despite this massive catch of highly migratory species, the fishery was not 
managed under a single institution or agreement.39 Roughly fifty percent of this 
catch was, and continues to be, taken within the exclusive economic zones of the 
region’s Pacific island developing states.40 Much of that catch, however, was 
caught by distant water fishing nations41 subject to fisheries access agreements,42 
through which a foreign fishing nation enters into a contractual agreement to 
access fish for a particular price.43 In addition, the portion of this catch that oc-
curred on the high seas (marine areas beyond national jurisdiction) was unregu-
lated.44 
                                                                                                                           
 37 SECRETARIAT OF THE WCPFC, REVIEW CONFERENCE ON THE AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OF 
10 DECEMBER 1982 RELATING TO THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH 
STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS 2 (2006), available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/
convention_agreements/reviewconf/wcpfc_reviewconference.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SU76-
3P8D. 
 38 Hanich et al., supra note 2, at 25–26. A separate estimate valued the fishery at $2.2 billion per 
year. Pepe Clarke, Management of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific, in SHARED RE-
SOURCES: ISSUES OF GOVERNANCE 199, 203 (Sharelle Hart ed., 2008). The “landed value” of fish is the 
value of the fish as they first leave the boat. ANDREW DYCK & U. RASHID SUMAILA, PEW ENVTL. GRP., 
OCEAN SCI. SERIES: MARINE FISHERIES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 1 (2010), available at http://www.
pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/peg/publications/report/PewOSSWorldEconomypdf.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/SS72-SCZZ. 
 39 SECRETARIAT OF THE WCPFC, supra note 37, at 2 (noting that fishing was conducted under a 
variety of bilateral and multilateral negotiated fisheries access arrangements). 
 40 Id. 
 41 A “distant water fishing nation” or “distant water fishing fleet” is a general reference to a coun-
try or group of vessels that fish outside its national waters. RAMÓN BONFIL ET AL., WORLD WILDLIFE 
FUND ENDANGERED SEAS CAMPAIGN, THE FOOTPRINT OF DISTANT WATER FLEETS ON WORLD 
FISHERIES 11 (1998), available at http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/distant_water1.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/WK6E-WKCH. 
 42 Id. 
 43 MARCOS A. ORELLANA ET AL., TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES ACCESS AGREEMENTS: 
ISSUES AND OPTIONS AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, at ix (2008), available at http://www.
unep.ch/etb/publications/FS%20Access%20Agreements/Inside%20FS%20Access%20Agreements.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D97X-W6AN. These fisheries access agreements are typically very 
beneficial to fishing nations, as opposed to those granting access. STEPHEN MBITHI MWIKYA, FISHER-
IES ACCESS AGREEMENTS: TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 1 (2006), available at http://www.
ictsd.org/downloads/2008/04/mbithi_2006.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F2NY-FBBP (“[F]inancial 
compensation in fisheries access agreements rarely exceed [ten] percent of the value of the catch.”). 
 44 MWIKYA, supra note 43, at 1. 
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Beginning in 1979 with the establishment of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Fisheries Agency (“FFA”),45 Pacific island states harmonized the provisions of 
fisheries access agreements and began coordinating the collection, compilation, 
and assessment of fisheries data through the SPC.46 Distant water fishing nations 
with significant financial and commercial interests in these fisheries—both with-
in the exclusive economic zones of Pacific island states and on the high seas—
could not become members of the FFA or the SPC.47 Yet, the treaty establishing 
the FFA recognized that “additional international machinery” would eventually 
be necessary “to provide for co-operation between all coastal states in the region 
and all states involved in the harvesting of [living marine resources] in the re-
gion.”48 
The early 1990s then saw the successful negotiation of several important 
agreements relating to the conservation and management of fisheries resources. 
These included the 1995 U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement,49 the 1993 U.N. Food and 
Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) Compliance Agreement,50 and the 1995 FAO 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.51 Against this background, the Pa-
cific island states and distant water fishing nations met in 1994 to negotiate new 
arrangements for the conservation and management of fish stocks in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean under the auspices of the Multilateral High Level 
                                                                                                                           
 45 The member nations of the FFA are Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micro-
nesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Sa-
moa, the Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. FFA Members, PAC. ISLANDS FO-
RUM FISHERIES AGENCY, https://www.ffa.int/members (last visited Mar. 27, 2015), archived at 
https://perma.cc/ST2Y-P99R. 
 46 FFA, FFC77, THE HARMONISED MINIMUM TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR FOREIGN FISHING 
VESSEL ACCESS (1997), available at http://www.ffa.int/system/files/HMTC%20FFC77%20Approved_0.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P6TV-EKEA; see also SECRETARIAT OF THE WCPFC, supra note 37, at 
2 (describing the background of access agreements). 
 47 The treaty establishing the FFA limits membership to South Pacific Forum members and other 
states or territories in the region (on the recommendation of the Committee and with the approval of 
the Forum). South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention art. II, July 10, 1979, 1579 U.N.T.S 
316, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201579/volume-1579-I-
27574-English.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/5YEV-CFD6. 
 48 Id. art. III(2); see supra note 45 and accompanying text (identifying the members of the FFA); 
infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text (identifying the members of the SPC).  
 49 United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New 
York, U.S.A, July 24–Aug. 4, 1995, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37 
(Sept. 8, 1995) [hereinafter U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement] (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001). 
 50 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, Nov. 24, 1993, 2221 U.N.T.S. 91. 
 51 FAO, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES (1995), available at http://www.fao.
org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/7LXH-2WU9. 
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Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.52 
The negotiations took six years to complete, and it took another four years 
for the WCPF Convention to enter into force.53 The Convention’s provisions and 
four-year delay for entry into force tell much about the difficulties of reaching an 
agreement. The WCPF Convention provides that the Convention will not enter 
into force until ratified or acceded to by three states situated north of the twenty 
degree parallel of north latitude (“northern states”) and seven states situated 
south of the twenty degree parallel of north latitude (“southern states”).54 The 
WCPF Convention, however, included a back-up plan: If the Convention was 
not ratified by three of the northern states, then the Convention would enter into 
force six months after ratification or accession by any thirteen states.55 With no 
northern states ratifying, the WCPF Convention entered into force in 2004 pur-
suant to the back-up plan, with ratification by thirteen southern states.56  
These provisions concerning entry into force reflect the different interests 
of the northern and southern fishing states. Historically, Japan, Taiwan, South 
Korea, and the United States—all distant water fishing nations—caught approx-
imately ninety percent of the total tuna catch in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean.57 These countries had an interest in the fisheries resources that differed 
substantially from those of the Pacific island developing states. Whereas the Pa-
cific island developing states wanted greater economic benefits from their tuna 
fisheries, the distant water fishing nations wanted the fish for commercial sale at 
extreme profit margins.58 In fact, the distant water fishing nations were paying 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See SECRETARIAT OF THE WCPFC, supra note 37, at 2. 
 53 About WCPFC, WCPFC, http://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc (last updated Mar. 25, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/3H27-MQPE. The negotiating states were Australia, Canada, China, the 
Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Fiji Islands, France, Indonesia, Japan, the Re-
public of Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, 
the Republic of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Philippines, 
the Republic of Korea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga, 
Tuvalu, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in respect of Pitcairn, Henderson, 
Ducie and the Oeno Islands, the United States of America, and the Republic of Vanuatu. SECRETARI-
AT OF THE WCPFC, supra note 37, at 2–3 n.2. 
 54 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 37. The WCPF Convention was opened for signature on 
September 5, 2000. Id. art. 34. It entered into force on June 19, 2004. See About WCPFC, supra note 
53. 
 55 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 36(2). 
 56 The thirteen states are Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Fiji 
Islands, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the 
Solomon Islands, and Tonga. See WCPFC, WCPFC2-2005-REV2, STATUS OF THE CONVENTION 2–3 
(2013) [hereinafter WCPFC, STATUS OF THE CONVENTION], available at https://www.wcpfc.int/node/
1115, archived at https://perma.cc/N8W9-L8QC. 
 57 Clarke, supra note 38, at 203. 
 58 Id. at 204. 
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access fees of, on average, approximately three to four percent of the gross reve-
nue from the tuna catch.59 As a result, the WCPF Convention creates provisions 
that apply to all WCPFC members through the whole Convention Area,60 as well 
as provisions that seek to balance the commercial interests of the distant water 
fishing nations with the economic and conservation interests of the Pacific island 
developing states.61 
The WCPF Convention sets an overall goal to “ensure, through effective 
management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory 
fish stocks in the [W]estern and [C]entral Pacific Ocean.”62 The Convention, 
which currently includes twenty-six members,63—seven participating territo-
ries64 and ten cooperating non-members65—establishes the WCPFC to adopt 
conservation and management measures (“CMMs”) for all stocks of highly mi-
gratory fish, such as tunas, billfish, and other species except sauries,66 found in 
the Convention Area.67 The Convention Area covers almost twenty percent of 
Earth’s surface,68 ranging from Australia and the East Asian seaboard—
excluding the South China Sea—in the west, to east of Hawaii in the east.69 The 
southern boundary of the Convention Area borders the Southern Ocean at sixty 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Id. 
 60 See, e.g., WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 5 (providing that “the members of the Commis-
sion shall” undertake a number of obligations). 
 61 MICHAEL POWLES, WCPFC, WCPFC/PREPCON/1, OPENING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN OF 
THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE 1 (2001), available at https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC_
PrepCon_1.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/K3KP-7X4N (stating that the WCPF Convention “was 
the product of five years of painstaking negotiations between coastal States and distant water fishing 
nations”). 
 62 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 2. 
 63 The members are Australia, Canada, China, the Cook Islands, the European Union, the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, the Republic of Korea, the Republic 
of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, the 
Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Tuvalu, the United States of America, and Vanuatu. About 
WCPFC, supra note 53. Indonesia recently became the twenty-sixth member of the WCPFC. 
WCPFC, STATUS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 56, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 64 The participating territories are American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Tokelau, and Wallis and Futuna. About WCPFC, 
supra note 53. 
 65 The cooperating non-members are Belize, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecua-
dor, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Senegal, St Kitts and Nevis, Thailand, and Vietnam. Id. The web-
site has not yet been updated to reflect Indonesia’s ratification of the Convention, which made it a full 
member of the WCPFC. See WCPFC, STATUS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 56, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 66 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(3). The Convention defines highly migratory fish as 
“all fish stocks of the species listed in Annex 1 of the 1982 Convention occurring in the Convention 
Area, and such other species of fish as the Commission may determine.” Id. art. 1(f). 
 67 Id. arts. 3(3), 9(1). 
 68 Frequently Asked Questions and Brochures, supra note 3. 
 69 For a map of the Convention Area, see Convention Area Map, WCPFC, http://www.wcpfc.int/
convention-area-map (last updated Mar. 23, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SFG2-PBHL. 
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degrees south latitude and the northern boundary reaches to Alaska and the Ber-
ing Sea.70 
To help fulfill the WCPF Convention’s conservation and management 
goals, WCPFC members must (a) adopt measures to ensure optimum utilization 
of fish stocks, (b) apply the precautionary approach,71 (c) minimize discards of 
target and non-target species, (d) protect marine biodiversity, and (e) implement 
and enforce CMMs through effective monitoring, control, and surveillance, 
among other things.72 In applying the precautionary approach, WCPFC members 
must adopt measures to ensure that a stock does not fall below a particular man-
agement goal (e.g., a specific population level), known as a “reference point”; 
the reference point shall not be exceeded, but if it is, the WCPFC members must 
take action “without delay” to restore the stocks.73 
The WCPF Convention directs members to implement these measures 
within their respective areas of national jurisdiction,74 which includes each 
member’s exclusive economic zones.75 It further provides that CMMs for fish 
stocks on the high seas shall be compatible with those established in areas under 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Specifically, the Convention’s jurisdiction ranges, 
From the south coast of Australia due south along the 141 [degree] meridian of east 
longitude to its intersection with the 55 [degree] parallel of south latitude; thence due 
east along the 55 [degree] parallel of south latitude to its intersection with the 150 [de-
gree] meridian of east longitude; thence due south along the 150 [degree] meridian of 
east longitude to its intersection with the 60 [degree] parallel of south latitude; thence 
due east along the 60 [degree] parallel of south latitude to its intersection with the 130 
[degree] meridian of west longitude; thence due north along the 13 [degree] meridian of 
west longitude to its intersection with the 4 [degree] parallel of south latitude; thence 
due west along the 4 [degree] parallel of south latitude to its intersection with the 150 
[degree] meridian of west longitude; thence due north along the 150 [degree] meridian 
of west longitude. 
WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1). 
 71 The WCPF Convention does not define the term “precautionary approach.” Instead, it estab-
lishes a set of principles to guide members as they apply it. See id. art 6, Annex II. 
 72 Id. art. 5. 
 73 Id. art. 6(2). 
 74 Id. art. 7(1). 
 75 Id. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) defines an exclusive 
economic zone as the area up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured in which coastal States have, among other things, “sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving[,] and managing the natural resources, whether living 
or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil.” U.N. Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea arts. 55–57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS] 
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
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national jurisdiction76 and that WCPFC member states “have a duty to cooperate 
for the purpose of achieving compatible measures in respect of such stocks.”77 
To fulfill its conservation and management goals, the WCPF Convention 
also establishes subsidiary bodies to provide scientific advice, make recommen-
dations to the WCPFC, and assist with implementation of the Convention.78 As 
described below, the different interests of the distant water fishing nations and 
the Pacific island developing states take shape within the different ways in which 
scientific advice is obtained and management advice is given to the WCPFC. 
A. The WCPFC 
The WCPFC, which includes all fishing entities79 that have agreed to be 
bound by the WCPF Convention,80 is the decision-making body of the WCPF 
Convention and is charged with ensuring the conservation and management of 
fish stocks in the Convention Area.81 To implement its conservation and man-
agement duties, the WCPFC meets once a year to determine catch limits for tar-
get species within the Convention Area and adopt other CMMs for target and 
non-target species.82 The CMMs the WCPFC establishes may include setting 
catch limits and catchable size limits for particular species, restricting the types 
and sizes of vessels allowed to fish, establishing geographical areas and times of 
year during which fishing may or may not occur, and specifying the technology 
that fishing operations may use.83 The WCPFC has used this authority to adopt a 
large number of CMMs relating to catch limits for various stocks,84 bycatch of 
                                                                                                                           
 76 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(1). 
 77 Id. An important legal question, unrelated to the issues discussed in this article, relates to the 
nature of this compatibility requirement. Article 7 appears to grant coastal States sovereign rights to 
adopt measures in areas of national jurisdiction, but Article 10 directs the WCPFC to adopt CMMs for 
all areas under the WCPFC’s authority, which includes areas of national jurisdiction. See WCPFC, 
WCPFC8-2011/12, REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WCPFC § 3.4.1 (2012) [hereinafter RE-
VIEW ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WCPFC], available at http://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/
WCPFC8-2011-12%20WCPFC%20Performance%20Review%20Report.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/HMB3-K73G. 
 78 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(2), Annex I. 
 79 The WCPF Convention allows non-States, such as Taiwan, to participate in the WCPFC. Id. 
These are known as “fishing entities.” Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. arts. 9–10. 
 82 Id. art. 10(1)–(3). Items may be included in the agenda for discussion and adoption based simp-
ly on a proposal from any WCPFC member, as well as from a recommendation of the Scientific 
Committee, Technical and Compliance Committee, and the Executive Director of the Secretariat. 
WCPFC, RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, Annex I, ¶ 2. 
 83 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 10(2). 
 84 See, e.g., WCPFC, CMM 2005-03, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURE FOR THE 
NORTH PACIFIC ALBACORE (2005), available at https://www.wcpfc.int/node/922, archived at https://
perma.cc/ACQ9-XBTK. 
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sea turtles,85 marking of vessels,86 and many other matters.87 The WCPFC may 
also enter into agreements with scientific experts and institutions to provide sci-
entific information on fish stocks.88 
The WCPFC must also encourage conservation and cooperation among its 
members; compile; evaluate; and disseminate data; implement international 
standards for responsible fishing operations; and establish mechanisms to moni-
tor enforcement of CMMs.89 In addition, it must consider reports and recom-
mendations of the Scientific Committee and the Technical and Compliance 
Committee “on matters within their respective areas of competence”90 when set-
ting total allowable catch levels or limitations on the total level of fishing ef-
fort.91 
Further, WCPFC members must provide to the WCPFC annual data on fish 
catches, information on steps taken to implement CMMs, and measures for regu-
lating fishing activities.92 The WCPF Convention also created a regional observ-
er program to collect verified catch data and other scientific and management 
information and to monitor the implementation of CMMs adopted by the 
WCPFC.93 This program involves the use of impartial observers and ensures that 
the WCPFC receives sufficient data on catch levels.94 
B. The Subsidiary Bodies of the WCPFC 
The WCPF Convention establishes three subsidiary bodies to aid the 
WCPFC in carrying out its functions: (1) the Scientific Committee, (2) the Tech-
                                                                                                                           
 85 WCPFC, CMM 2008-03, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF SEA TURTLES (2008), avail-
able at https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2008-03/conservation-and-management-sea-turtles, archived 
at https://perma.cc/H7SH-QKR5. 
 86 WCPFC, CMM 2004-03, SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE MARKING AND IDENTIFICATION OF FISH-
ING VESSELS (2004), available at https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2004-03/specifications-marking-
and-identification-fishing-vessels, archived at https://perma.cc/5RNY-MDU4. 
 87 See, e.g., Conservation and Management Measures, WCPFC, http://www.wcpfc.int/conservation-
and-management-measures (last updated Feb. 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/LY2W-Z4DV.WCPF 
Convention, supra note 1, arts. 9(5), 13(1), 22(5). 
 88 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, arts. 9(5), 13(1), 22(5). 
 89 Id. art. 10(1). 
 90 Id. art. 10(5). 
 91 Id. art. 10(3). The WCPF Convention does not define “fishing effort,” but the term generally 
refers to “a given combination of inputs into the fishing activity, such as the number of hours or days 
spent fishing, numbers of hooks used (in long-line fishing), kilometres of nets used, etc.” Fishing 
Effort, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=994 (last 
updated Mar. 5, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/DM8U-6P5E. 
 92 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 23. 
 93 Id. art. 28(1). 
 94 Id. art. 28. 
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nical and Compliance Committee, and (3) the Northern Committee.95 Each sub-
sidiary body makes recommendations to the WCPFC within their “respective 
areas of competence.”96 Based on these recommendations, the WCPFC makes 
conservation and management decisions to achieve the WCPF Convention’s 
goals.97 
1. The Scientific Committee 
The Scientific Committee ensures that the WCPFC has the “best scientific 
information available.”98 To provide such information, the Scientific Committee 
“review[s] the assessments, analyses, other work[,] and recommendations pre-
pared for the [WCPFC] by the scientific experts prior to the consideration of 
such recommendations by the [WCPFC].”99 The Scientific Committee then pro-
vides “information, advice[,] and comments” about the results of research and 
analyses of target and non-target stocks in the Convention Area.100 It also rec-
ommends a research plan to the WCPFC, encourages coordination of scientific 
research in the Convention Area, reports to the WCPFC on its findings on the 
status of stocks in the Convention Area, and “make[s] reports and recommenda-
tions to the [WCPFC] as directed, or on its own initiative, on matters concerning 
the conservation and management of and research on . . . species in the Conven-
tion Area.”101 
2. The Technical and Compliance Committee 
The Technical and Compliance Committee provides the WCPFC with 
technical advice on implementation of CMMs.102 In particular, it ensures imple-
mentation of CMMs by WCPFC members by monitoring compliance, and it 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. art. 11(1), (7). The WCPFC also established the standing Finance and Administration 
Committee (“FAC”) as a subsidiary body pursuant to article 11(6) of the WCPF Convention. WCPFC, 
THIRD REGULAR SESSION ¶ 181 (2006) [hereinafter WCPFC, THIRD REGULAR SESSION], available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC3%20-Summary%20Report%20Consolidated%20report.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YC9M-QHAJ. The FAC, however, is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. 
 96 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(1). 
 97 Id. arts. 10(5), 11(7). 
 98 Id. art. 12(1). 
 99 Id. art. 12(2)(b). 
 100 Id. art. 12(2)(d). The WCPFC must “tak[e] into account any recommendation of the Scientific 
Committee” when “engag[ing] the services of scientific experts to provide information and advice on 
the fishery resource covered by [the] Convention.” Id. art. 13(1). All reports and recommendations 
prepared by scientific experts “shall be provided to the Scientific Committee[,]” as well as “reports on 
the results of [the expert’s] scientific work, advice and recommendations in support of the formulation 
of conservation and management measures[,] and other relevant matters.” Id. art. 13(2)(d), (5). 
 101 Id. art. 12(2)(a), (e), (g). 
 102 Id. art. 14(1). 
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makes additional recommendations to the WCPFC if further cooperative 
measures are necessary.103 To carry out these functions, it receives reports relat-
ing to monitoring and investigation of, and punishment for, violations of the 
WCPF Convention; 104 makes recommendations to the WCPFC on, among other 
things, fishing gear and technology that fishing operations may use; 105 reports to 
the WCPFC its findings and conclusions relating to the extent of compliance 
with CMMs; makes recommendations to the WCPFC on matters relating to 
monitoring, control, surveillance, and enforcement; 106 and considers other mat-
ters as referred to it by the WCPFC.107 Significantly, the Technical and Compli-
ance Committee does not have independent authority to sanction members for 
non-compliance; instead, if it concludes that a member is in non-compliance 
with a CMM, it can make recommendations to the WCPFC for addressing that 
non-compliance.108 
3. The Northern Committee 
The Northern Committee recommends CMMs to the WCPFC concerning 
“stocks which occur mostly” in the area north of twenty degrees north lati-
tude.109 It comprises those WCPFC members situated or fishing in this area110—
mostly distant water fishing nations.111 The WCPFC has identified only three 
stocks—Pacific bluefin tuna, northern albacore, and the northern stock of sword-
fish—as occurring primarily north of twenty degrees north latitude.112 It has des-
ignated those stocks as “northern stocks” within the jurisdiction of the Northern 
Committee.113 Based on the advice of the Scientific Committee, the WCPFC 
may add species to the list of northern stocks,114 but it has never done so.115 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. art. 14(2)(b). 
 105 Id. art. 14(2)(f). 
 106 Id. art. 14(2)(h). 
 107 Id. art. 14(2)(d). 
 108 See generally id. art. 14(1)–(2) (describing the functions of the Technical and Compliance 
Committee). 
 109 Id. art. 11(7); WCPFC, RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, Annex I, ¶ 2 (naming of the 
Northern Committee). The Northern Committee comprises WCPFC members situated north of twenty 
degrees north latitude and members fishing in this area. WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(7); 
WCPFC, RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, Annex I, ¶ 1. 
 110 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(7). 
 111 The members of the Northern Committee are Canada, the Cook Islands, Japan, Korea, Chinese 
Taipei, the United States of America, and Vanuatu. N. COMM., WCPFC, NORTHERN COMMITTEE 
SECOND REGULAR SESSION 10–19 (2006), available at https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/Northern
%20Committee%20Final%20Report%20-%20Second%20Regular%20Session.pdf, archived at https://
perma.cc/5GJN-BM2J. 
 112 WCPFC, RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, Annex I, ¶ 5. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
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In contrast with the Scientific Committee, the Northern Committee lacks an 
express mandate to review scientific assessments of any stocks within the pur-
view of the WCPFC.116 Instead, it reviews scientific information on fish stocks 
that it requests from the ISC.117 Also unlike the Scientific Committee, which is 
charged with reviewing scientific information and making recommendations to 
the WCPFC with respect to all stocks within the Convention Area, the Northern 
Committee may make recommendations only with respect to specified “north-
ern” stocks.118 
The creation of two pathways for providing scientific advice was a key 
compromise among the negotiators of the WCPF Convention119 as they sought 
to balance the interests of distant water fishing nations and the Pacific island 
states in whose waters the migratory species managed by the WCPF Convention 
inhabit.120 As explained in Part III, by creating two pathways for providing sci-
entific advice to the WCPFC, the WCPF Convention and the WCPFC members 
have created confusion as to whose advice the WCPFC must follow.121 
C. The Scientific Service Providers 
In addition to relying on its subsidiary bodies, the WCPFC may obtain in-
formation and advice from outside scientific experts.122 Before contracting with 
scientific experts, however, the WCPFC must take into account any recommen-
dation of the Scientific Committee.123 All reports and recommendations of scien-
                                                                                                                           
 115 See N. COMM., WCPFC, SUMMARY REPORT: NORTHERN COMMITTEE NINTH REGULAR SES-
SION § 2.3 (2013) [hereinafter N. COMM., NINTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT], available at 
https://www.cpfc.int/meetings/9th-regular-session-northern-committee, archived at https://perma.cc/
869S-6K6L (summarizing the discussions of the Northern Committee for northern stocks). At its tenth 
meeting, however, the WCPFC directed the Scientific Committee to determine whether the blue shark 
qualified as a “northern stock.” WCPFC TENTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 
16, ¶ 217. 
 116 Compare WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 12 (establishing the functions of the Scientific 
Committee), with id. art. 11(7) (establishing the functions of the Northern Committee), and WCPFC, 
RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, Annex I (establishing the procedural rules by which the North-
ern Committee must execute its functions). 
 117 See infra notes 139–150 and accompanying text. 
 118 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(7). 
 119 See REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WCPFC, supra note 77, § 5.6 (stating that “[t]he 
Panel understands the present WCPFC structure was a compromise from the negotiations that created 
the Commission, particularly with respect to its subsidiary bodies”). 
 120 See DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AM., PREPARATORY CONFERENCE FOR THE 
COMM’N FOR THE CONSERVATION & MGMT. OF HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS IN THE W. & 
CENT. PAC., WCPFC/PREPCON/DP.18, NORTHERN COMMITTEE PROPOSAL: VIEWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES (2003), available at https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC_PrepCon_DP18%28US_
comments_on_N_Committee%29.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/TV6R-RDYN. 
 121 See infra notes 301–422 and accompanying text. 
 122 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 13(1). 
 123 Id. 
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tific experts must be provided to both the Scientific Committee and the 
WCPFC.124 The WCPFC may also make other arrangements for the periodic 
review of information provided by scientific experts.125 
The WCPF Convention allows outside scientific experts to provide an array 
of research and analysis in support of the WCPFC’s work.126 For example, scien-
tific experts may develop stock-specific reference points and assess the status of 
stocks.127 They may also provide the WCPFC and the Scientific Committee with 
reports and provide advice and recommendations on conservation measures.128 
Using this authority, the WCPFC has entered into agreements with the SPC and 
the ISC. 
1. The Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
The Pacific Community—formerly known as the South Pacific Commis-
sion—is a regional organization established in 1947 by six “participating gov-
ernments” who administered territories in the Pacific.129 Now including twenty-
six members,130 the Pacific Community engages its members in a variety of is-
                                                                                                                           
 124 Id. art. 13(5). 
 125 Id. art. 13(4). 
 126 Id. art. 13(2). Specifically, experts may: 
(a) undertake the collection, compilation[,] and dissemination of fisheries data accord-
ing to agreed principles and procedures established by the Commission, including pro-
cedures and policies relating to the confidentiality, disclosure[,] and publication of data; 
(b) conduct assessments of highly migratory fish stocks, non-target species, and species 
belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon such stocks, 
within the Convention Area; (c) assess the impacts of fishing, other human activities[,] 
and environmental factors on target stocks and species belonging to the same ecosystem 
or dependent upon or associated with the target stocks; (d) assess the potential effects of 
proposed changes in the methods or levels of fishing and of proposed conservation and 
management measures; and (e) investigate such other scientific matters as may be re-
ferred to them by the Commission. 
Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission art. I, Feb. 6, 1947, 2 U.S.T. 1787, 97 
U.N.T.S. 227, available at http://www.spc.int/images/stories/About_SPC/Canberra-Agreement.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/HQ5E-4PXV (entered into force July 29, 1948); History, SECRETARIAT OF 
THE PAC. CMTY., http://www.spc.int/en/about-spc/history.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/SX2G-FYBR. The six countries are Australia, France, New Zealand, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. History, supra. 
 130 Twenty-two Pacific Island countries and territories and Australia, France, New Zealand, and 
the United States. The twenty-two Pacific Island countries and territories are: American Samoa, the 
Cooke Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, the Mar-
shall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
the Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and 
Futuna. Members of the Pacific Community, SECRETARIAT OF THE PAC. CMTY., http://www.spc.int/
 
364 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:347 
sues—including public health, economic and social development, climate 
change, and fisheries—to “help Pacific Island people achieve sustainable devel-
opment.”131 Now more commonly referred to as the “SPC,” the Pacific Commu-
nity constitutes the region’s primary technical and scientific organization.132 
The WCPFC’s MoU with the SPC calls on the SPC to provide scientific 
services, including data management services, to the WCPFC.133 Under the 
MoU and accompanying triennial service agreement,134 the SPC’s Oceanic Fish-
eries Programme collects, compiles, and disseminates fisheries data; undertakes 
regional stock assessments of key target and non-target species; conducts eco-
system analyses; and advises on the WCPFC’s strategies for monitoring and con-
trolling fishing activities.135 The range of fisheries data collected and compiled 
by the SPC’s Oceanic Fisheries Programme is immense and includes annual 
catch estimates, aggregated catch and effort data, and size composition data.136 It 
also compiles observer data, port sampling data, tagging data, oceanographic 
data, and various types of biological data.137 Neither the MoU nor the triennial 
service agreement describes how the SPC will communicate with WCPF Con-
vention bodies, although some specific elements of the work program specify 
that WCPFC members may request information from the SPC through the Exec-
utive Secretary of the Secretariat.138 
2. The International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in 
the Northern Pacific Ocean 
Unlike the SPC, which predates the WCPF Convention, the ISC was estab-
lished by the United States and Japan in 1995 specifically to provide information 
on tuna and tuna-like species in the North Pacific Ocean to the Northern Com-
                                                                                                                           
en/about-spc/members.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2FFY-Z46R. In 
2004, the United Kingdom withdrew from the Pacific Community. History, supra note 129. The 
Netherlands withdrew in 1962. Id. 
 131 SECRETARIAT OF THE PAC. CMTY., http://www.spc.int/en/index.php (last visited Mar. 27, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7KW5-8N4H. The Pacific Community was originally established 
“to restore stability to a region that had experienced the turbulence of the Second World War, to assist 
in administering their dependent territories and to benefit the people of the Pacific.” History, supra 
note 129. 
 132 Employment, SECRETARIAT OF THE PAC. CMTY., http://www.spc.int/en/recrutement.html (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/M58C-WBS3. 
 133 Revised Memorandum of Understanding, WCPFC-Secretariat of the Pac. Cmty., Mar. 4, 2010 
[hereinafter WCPFC-SPC MoU], available at https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC-SPC%20
MoU.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/3TLB-RQDV. 
 134 Id. Annex I. 
 135 Id. 
 136 REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WCPFC, supra note 77, § 5.5.1. 
 137 Id. 
 138 WCPFC-SPC MoU, supra note 133, Annex I, Activity iv.9. 
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mittee and the WCPFC.139 As with the creation of the Northern Committee, the 
creation of the ISC was part of the package of compromises between distant wa-
ter fishing nations and other WCPFC members.140 The purposes of the ISC in-
clude “enhancing scientific research and cooperation for conservation and ra-
tional utilization of tuna and tuna-like species in the North Pacific Ocean” and 
“build[ing] and strengthen[ing] the regional scientific framework for conserva-
tion and rational utilization of these species.”141 
The WCPFC’s MoU with the ISC calls for the ISC to provide scientific 
services to the WCPFC regarding northern stocks and bycatch of fish and non-
fish species.142 Specifically, the Northern Committee “may request” scientific 
information and advice from the ISC regarding fish stocks.143 The authority to 
provide advice regarding fish stocks distinguishes the ISC from the SPC.144 The 
ISC provides this information and advice to the Northern Committee, the 
WCPFC, and the Scientific Committee.145 In addition, the ISC provides its nor-
mal committee and working group reports “directly to” the Northern Committee, 
the WCPFC, and the Scientific Committee.146 This information and advice is 
presented at the annual meetings of the Northern Committee and Scientific 
Committee and “may be” presented to the WCPFC.147 
The MoU does not expressly grant the WCPFC or the Scientific Committee 
the authority to request information from the ISC. This limitation on the WCPFC 
                                                                                                                           
 139 The two countries established the “Interim Scientific Committee.” Press Release, Int’l Scien-
tific Comm. for Tuna & Tuna-like Species in the N. Pac. Ocean (Jan. 13, 1995), available at http://
isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/about_isc/press_release.html, archived at http://perma.cc/LG65-VFSA. The name 
was changed to “International” in 2005. See id. 
 140 REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WCPFC, supra note 77, § 5.6. 
 141 JERRY AULT ET AL., INT’L SCIENTIFIC COMM. FOR TUNA & TUNA-LIKE SPECIES IN THE N. 
PAC. OCEAN, ISC/13/PLENARY/10, REPORT OF THE PEER REVIEW OF FUNCTION § 2.1 (2013) [here-
inafter REPORT OF THE ISC PEER REVIEW OF FUNCTION], available at http://isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/pdf/
ISC13pdf/Plenary%2010-%20Peer%20Review%20of%20Function_1.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/2SGE-JG97 (prepared for the Thirteenth Meeting of the ISC, held from 17–22 July 2013, in Busan, 
Korea). 
 142 WCPFC-ISC MoU, supra note 12, pt. I. 
 143 Id. 
 144 According to one report, this authority—to give advice on the management of fish stocks 
directly to the Northern Committee—gives the ISC “near-equivalent status” to the Scientific Commit-
tee. DAVID AGNEW ET AL., MRAG LTD. & WCPFC, WCPFC-SC5-2009/GN-WP-7, FINAL REPORT 
ON INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S TRANSITIONAL SCIENCE STRUCTURE AND FUNC-
TIONS § 5.2.1 (2009) [hereinafter REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S TRANSITIONAL SCIENCE STRUC-
TURE], available at http://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC-SC5-2009-GN-WP-7%20%28Project
%20report%20on%20Independent%20Review%29.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4WTD-XCV6. 
The authors disagree that the ISC has near-equivalent status to the Scientific Committee. More accu-
rately, the ISC has functions similar to those of the Scientific Committee, but its legal status differs 
markedly from that of the Scientific Committee. See infra notes 304–337 and accompanying text. 
 145 REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S TRANSITIONAL SCIENCE STRUCTURE, supra note 144, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 146 Id. ¶ 3. 
 147 Id. ¶ 4. 
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and the Scientific Committee “prevents a more fluent dialogue between the 
Commission and the Scientific Committee with the ISC.”148 In some circum-
stances, the lack of transparency and fluid dialogue has resulted “in particular 
concerns with the assessments being undertaken by the ISC and their associated 
data inputs.”149 It has also given rise to the question at the heart of this Article 
and addressed in Part II below: On whose information and advice must the 
WCPFC rely with respect to northern stocks, the SPC and Scientific Commit-
tee’s or the ISC and Northern Committee’s?150 
II. UNTANGLING THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLES WITHIN THE WCPFC 
Although the description of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission’s (“WCPFC”) institutions in Part I of this Article appears relatively 
straightforward, it masks the underlying tension among the WCPFC members 
over the roles of the institutions and the corresponding challenge of managing 
this valuable fishery in a sustainable manner.151 Several recent incidents have 
brought these concerns to a troubling flashpoint. As described in the introduc-
tion, establishing the appropriate fishing mortality rate for Pacific bluefin tuna 
has been a continuing source of friction among WCPFC members.152 Although 
the 2012 stock assessment of the International Scientific Committee for Tuna 
and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean (“ISC”) estimates the Pacific 
bluefin tuna population at just 3.6 percent of historic biomass,153 the WCPFC’s 
Northern Committee recommended a measure that would allow overall catches 
to rise above levels seen in the last two years.154 The Northern Committee did 
                                                                                                                           
 148 REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WCPFC, supra note 77, § 5.6. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See infra notes 151–300 and accompanying text. 
 151 See supra notes 37–150 and accompanying text. 
 152 See N. COMM., WCPFC, SUMMARY REPORT: NORTHERN COMMITTEE SIXTH REGULAR SES-
SION ¶¶ 17–30 (2010) [hereinafter N. COMM., SIXTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT], availa-
ble at https://www.wcpfc.int/meetings/6th-regular-session-northern-committee, archived at https://
perma.cc/D4Y2-P9Q6 (summarizing the debate concerning bluefin tuna); SCIENTIFIC COMM., 
WCPFC, SUMMARY REPORT: SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE SIXTH REGULAR SESSION ¶ 333 (2010) [here-
inafter SCIENTIFIC COMM., SIXTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT], available at https://www.
wcpfc.int/meetings/6th-regular-session-scientific-committee, archived at https://perma.cc/A44J-5YZN 
(noting that in 2010 the Scientific Committee “remained concerned that the impact of the new meas-
ure in reversing trends in spawning stock biomass and fishing mortality of this species, particularly on 
juvenile age classes (ages 0–3), remains to be seen”). 
 153 See Pacific Bluefin Tuna Working Group, INT’L SCIENTIFIC COMM. FOR TUNA & TUNA-LIKE 
SPECIES IN THE N. PAC. OCEAN, http://isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/working_groups/pacific_bluefin_tuna.html 
(last updated July 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q24U-8SHB (stating that “[c]urrent spawning 
stock biomass is near their lowest level (3.6%) and has been declining for over a decade”). 
 154 CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURE FOR PACIFIC BLUEFIN TUNA, supra note 16, at 
1 (noting that the ISC stated that a “[f]urther reduction of fishing mortality, especially for juvenile 
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this despite recommendations from both the ISC and the WCPFC’s Scientific 
Committee to reduce fishing mortality to limit the risk of further population de-
clines.155 Nonetheless, the WCPFC failed to reduce fishing mortality for Pacific 
bluefin tuna at its December 2013 meeting.156 
The Pacific bluefin tuna is not the only flashpoint. In 2011, for example, 
neither the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (“SPC”) nor the ISC provided a 
stock assessment for North Pacific striped marlin.157 The stock is not designated 
as a “northern stock,” but the ISC indicated that it would complete a stock as-
sessment in 2011—it did not.158 As a consequence, the Scientific Committee, at 
its seventh annual regular meeting, recommended an immediate reduction in 
fishing mortality,159 to which the WCPFC agreed.160 The WCPFC further rec-
ommended that the SPC undertake the stock assessment for North Pacific striped 
marlin if the ISC failed to provide stock assessment results to the Scientific 
Committee before its eighth annual regular meeting.161 The WCPFC members 
“called into question the ability of the ISC process to deliver on this issue,” and, 
                                                                                                                           
fish[,] is needed to reduce the risk of [spawning stock biomass] falling below its historically lowest 
level”). 
 155 SCIENTIFIC COMM., NINTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 196 (not-
ing the majority view that, “the fishing mortality on Pacific bluefin tuna be immediately reduced, 
especially on juveniles, in order to reduce the risk of recruitment collapse and allow the spawning 
stock to rebuild”). 
 156 Instead, the WCPFC adopted a new conservation and management measure (“CMM”) calling 
for a new management objective to ensure the current level of fishing mortality rate “is not increased.” 
CMM FOR PACIFIC BLUEFIN TUNA, supra note 16, ¶ 1. Conservationists called on the WCPFC to 
reject the Northern Committee’s recommendation, stating, 
[T]he WCPFC should recommend that the Northern Committee develop a rebuilding 
plan for Pacific bluefin tuna for adoption by the 11th Regular Session of the WCPFC 
that includes catch limits that would return the population to . . . [twenty-five] percent 
of the original population size . . . within the next [ten] years. 
PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 10TH REGULAR SESSION OF THE WESTERN 
AND CENTRAL PACIFIC FISHERIES COMMISSION 4 (2013), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/
media/Assets/2013/11/14/Pew-WCPFC-Policy-Brief_2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2D2H-
RKRT. 
 157 See REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WCPFC, supra note 77, § 5.2. 
 158 Id. 
 159 SCIENTIFIC COMM., WCPFC, SUMMARY REPORT: SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE SEVENTH REGU-
LAR SESSION ¶ 50 (2011) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC COMM., SEVENTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY 
REPORT], available at https://www.wcpfc.int/meetings/7th-regular-session-scientific-committee, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/B3LP-HU7Y. 
 160 WCPFC, CMM 2010-01, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURE FOR NORTH PACIFIC 
STRIPED MARLIN (2010) [hereinafter WCPFC, NORTH PACIFIC STRIPED MARLIN CMM], available at 
https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2010-01/conservation-and-management-measure-north-pacific-
striped-marlin, archived at https://perma.cc/3FQ5-ZATK. 
 161 SCIENTIFIC COMM., SEVENTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 159, ¶ 51. 
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consequently, recommended that the SPC perform a new stock assessment in 
2012.162 
Another flashpoint over a question of authority recently emerged with re-
spect to the blue shark stock assessment. In 2012, Japan and the ISC noted that 
the work plans of both the SPC and ISC included an assessment of blue shark 
populations and expressed concern about duplication of effort if the work was 
not coordinated.163 An ISC representative echoed this concern, and noted that 
originally the SPC and ISC had agreed that the ISC would undertake assess-
ments of both blue sharks and shortfin mako sharks, but that the position of the 
SPC “appeared to have changed.”164 According to the ISC, it and the WCPFC, 
along with the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission,165 agreed that the 
ISC would be responsible for undertaking a stock assessment for blue shark 
stocks in the North Pacific.166 Later, however, the SPC stated that it would also 
assess North Pacific blue shark.167 The SPC and ISC shared some catch and oth-
er information and even agreed that the blue shark assessment would be a joint 
SPC-ISC product that the ISC’s shark working group and Plenary would review 
before submission to the WCPFC.168 The SPC, however, did not complete the 
assessment in time for review by the ISC’s shark working group.169 
These conflicts over which body is the key supplier of scientific advice to 
the WCPFC have resulted in a “particularly caustic atmosphere and high and 
palpable degree of animosity between [the] ISC and the [Scientific] Committee” 
that must be repaired to manage fish stocks properly.170 To ensure the effective 
management of these valuable fish stocks, the WCPFC must resolve these ten-
sions by identifying clearly the lines of communication and decision-making 
authority, particularly with respect to the northern stocks. This Part untangles the 
lines of communication and decision-making between and among the WCPFC, 
the Scientific Committee, the Northern Committee, the SPC, and the ISC, as 
established in the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western Pacific Ocean (the “WCPF Convention” or 
                                                                                                                           
 162 Further, they recommended that the SPC perform a new stock assessment in 2012. Id. ¶ 267. 
 163 N. COMM., EIGHT REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 22, § 2.4.3. 
 164 Id. 
 165 “The IATTC is responsible for the conservation and management of tuna and other marine 
resources in the eastern Pacific Ocean.” INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA COMM’N, http://www.
iattc.org/Homeeng.htm (last updated Mar. 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/NJM6-NZZM. Its 
members are Belize, the European Union, Nicaragua, Canada, France, Panama, China, Guatemala, 
Peru, Colombia, Japan, Chinese Taipei, Costa Rica, Kiribati, the United States, Ecuador, Korea, Va-
nuatu, El Salvador, Mexico, and Venezuela. Id. 
 166 REPORT OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING OF THE ISC, supra note 23, § 5.1. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 REPORT OF THE PEER REVIEW OF FUNCTION, supra note 141, § 6.2. 
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the “Convention”) and other relevant agreements. In particular, this Part answers 
the following questions:  
Which body has the authority to advise the WCPFC about conserva-
tion and management measures (“CMMs”) for the northern stocks, 
the Scientific Committee or the Northern Committee? 
 
When the Scientific Committee has concerns about the scientific in-
formation provided to the Northern Committee by the ISC, may the 
Scientific Committee seek additional information or advise the 
WCPFC to reject a CMM proposed by the Northern Committee? If it 
does, then what, if anything, is the WCPFC required to do in re-
sponse?  
A. The WCPFC’s Decision-Making Hierarchy 
The WCPF Convention clearly establishes a three-tiered legal hierarchy 
among the Convention’s institutions.171 The functional hierarchy of the Conven-
tion’s institutions is not, however, so clearly established. It is this hierarchy that 
has led to tensions between the Scientific Committee on the one hand and the 
ISC and Northern Committee on the other hand. This functional hierarchy, which 
lies at the heart of this Article, is described in Section 2, below.  
1. The Legal Hierarchy of WCPFC Bodies 
The WCPF Convention establishes a clear, three-tiered hierarchy for deci-
sion-making authority among the WCPFC, the subsidiary bodies, and scientific 
experts such as the SPC and the ISC.172 The WCPFC sits at the top of the hierar-
chy.173 The WCPF Convention specifically makes the WCPFC responsible for 
adopting the CMMs to further the goals of the WCPF Convention.174 It is the 
only WCPF Convention entity with an international legal personality.175 
The three subsidiary bodies—the Northern Committee, the Scientific 
Committee, and the Technical and Compliance Committee—sit in the middle of 
the hierarchy.176 Although these committees might be on an equivalent hierar-
chical plane, their roles are distinct.177 Moreover, the Scientific Committee’s ob-
                                                                                                                           
 171 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, arts. 9, 10, 11, 16; see infra notes 172–181 and accompany-
ing text. 
 172 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, arts. 9–10. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 See id. art. 9(6) (describing the WCPFC’s international legal personality). 
 176 Id. art. 11. 
 177 See id. 
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ligation to review assessments, analyses, and recommendations prepared for the 
WCPFC by scientific experts gives it an important role in overseeing the quality 
and veracity of information provided to the WCPFC.178 
The institutions providing scientific services to the WCPFC—the SPC and 
the ISC—sit at the bottom of the hierarchy.179 The Convention does not define 
the role of these institutions. Rather, the WCPFC may enter into contractual or 
other arrangements with external institutions to provide it specified services.180 
In the absence of such arrangements, these institutions have no WCPF Conven-
tion-mandated role.181 
2. The Functional Hierarchy of WCPFC Bodies 
Although the legal hierarchy of WCPF Convention bodies is clear, the 
terms of reference included in the foundational documents for these bodies cre-
ate confusion as to the functional roles and the scope of authority of each 
body.182 Despite this confusion, an interpretation of the foundational documents 
based on their ordinary meaning leaves no doubt of the following: (1) the 
WCPFC has broad—although bounded—authority to make decisions and seek 
information it believes it needs to make decisions for the conservation and man-
agement of fish stocks within the Convention Area, and (2) the Scientific Com-
mittee has overall responsibility to provide advice to the WCPFC, even when 
recommendations arise out of the ISC and the Northern Committee.  
a. The WCPFC Decision-Making Process 
The WCPFC is the decision-making body instructed by the WCPF Conven-
tion to adopt CMMs for highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area.183 
                                                                                                                           
 178 Id. art. 12. 
 179 Id. art. 16. 
 180 Id. arts. 9(5) (granting the WCPFC authority to enter into “contractual arrangements with 
relevant institutions to provide expert services necessary for the efficient functioning of the WCPFC 
and to enable it to carry out effectively its responsibilities under this Convention”), 13(1) (granting the 
WCPFC the authority to “engage the services of scientific experts to provide information and advice 
on the fishery resources covered by this Convention and related matters that may be relevant to the 
conservation and management of those resources”), 22(2) (directing the WCPFC to make “suitable 
arrangements for consultation, cooperation[,] and collaboration with other relevant intergovernmental 
organizations”), 22(5) (granting the WCPFC authority to enter into relationship agreements with or-
ganizations, “with a view to obtaining the best available scientific and other fisheries-related infor-
mation to further the attainment of the objective of [the] Convention and to minimize duplication with 
respect to [its] work”). 
 181 See generally supra note 180 and accompanying text (illustrating the structure by which the 
scientific-service-providing institutions—the SPC and the ISC—fit into the WCPF Convention). 
 182 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, arts. 9, 10, 11, 16; see supra notes 172–181 and accompany-
ing text. 
 183 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 5. 
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The WCPFC’s discretion to adopt CMMs, however, is bounded by the Conven-
tion’s geographic scope,184 voting rules,185 and other provisions.186 In addition, 
the WCPFC must follow a specified decision-making approach with respect to 
northern stocks.187 
The WCPFC’s decision-making and voting rules begin to untangle the con-
fusion established by the various foundational documents. As a general matter, 
the WCPFC makes decisions by consensus.188 If the WCPFC members cannot 
reach a consensus, the WCPFC may make a decision on a procedural issue with 
approval by a simple majority.189 With regard to substantive issues, the WCPFC 
may adopt the decision by a “three-fourths majority of those present and vot-
ing,”190 although some “substantive” decisions require consensus.191 When a 
vote is taken, the three-fourths majority must include within it both a three-
fourths majority of the members of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency 
(“FFA”) and a three-fourth majority of non-members of the FFA that are present 
and voting.192 In addition, a proposal may not be defeated by two or fewer votes 
of either voting bloc.193 If, however, the WCPF Convention expressly provides 
that a decision must be by consensus, the WCPFC may appoint a conciliator to 
reconcile the differences in order to achieve consensus.194 All decisions become 
binding sixty days after the WCPFC adopts them,195 at which point members of 
the WCPFC must implement and enforce the measures.196 
                                                                                                                           
 184 Id. art. 3. 
 185 Id. art. 20; see infra notes 310–321 and accompanying text. 
 186 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 10 (describing the functions of the WCPFC and, for 
example, describing the criteria that the WCPFC should take into account when allocating total allow-
able catch). 
 187 Id. art. 11(7). 
 188 Id. art. 20; see also WCPFC, RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, Rule 22(1) (stating that, 
as a procedural rule, generally all decisions are made by consensus). 
 189 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 20(2); see WCPFC, RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 
29, Rule 22(2). This provision applies except where the Convention expressly provides that a decision 
must be by consensus. WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 20(1), (4). If a decision must be by con-
sensus, the WCPFC can appoint a mediator to reconcile differences to reach a consensus. Id. 
 190 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 20(2); WCPFC, RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, 
Rule 22(2). 
 191 WCPFC, RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, Rule 23. These decisions include, for exam-
ple, adoption of the budget and amendments to the Convention. WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 
18(1). 
 192 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 20(2). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. art. 20(4). Also, a party that votes against a decision or that is absent during a vote may 
seek review of any decision by a review panel within thirty days. Id. art. 20(6); see also id. art. 20(7)–
(9) (establishing the review procedures). 
 195 Id. art. 20(5). 
 196 Id. arts. 23, 25. Members must, for example, collect evidence of and prosecute offenses of 
such measures, keep records of all vessels authorized to fly their flags, and provide these records to 
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Applying these rules is straightforward with respect to fish stocks not des-
ignated as northern stocks, such as South Pacific albacore.197 For these stocks, 
the SPC evaluates their status,198 and the Scientific Committee then uses the 
evaluation to provide recommendations to the WCPFC.199 The WCPFC then 
uses the process described above to adopt CMMs. 
The decision-making process differs with respect to northern stocks. For 
these stocks, the decision of the WCPFC must “be based on any recommenda-
tions of the [northern] committee,”200 recommendations which are based on sci-
entific information provided by the ISC.201 The WCPFC “shall not take a deci-
sion with regard to any such measure without a recommendation concerning 
such measure from the Northern Committee.”202 For example, with respect to 
the most recent CMM for North Pacific albacore, the Northern Committee ob-
served that the best scientific evidence from the ISC “indicates that the species is 
either fully exploited, or may be experiencing fishing mortality above levels that 
are sustainable in the long term.”203 The Northern Committee thus recommended 
that fishing effort not exceed current levels.204 The WCPFC then adopted a 
CMM to maintain fishing effort for North Pacific albacore in the Convention 
Area north of the equator at current levels.205 
If the WCPFC does not accept the Northern Committee’s recommendation, 
it “shall return the matter to the committee for further consideration” and the 
Northern Committee “shall reconsider the matter in light of the views expressed 
by the [WCPFC].”206 This apparently has never happened, although the WCPFC 
has asked the Northern Committee to review its advice concerning particular 
stocks.207 
                                                                                                                           
the WCPFC, and, where necessary, board and inspect vessels to ensure that all vessels are following 
the above stated requirements. Id. arts. 24(6)–(8), 25. 
 197 See supra notes 95–120 and accompanying text (describing the distinction between northern 
fish stocks and other stocks). 
 198 WCPFC-SPC MoU, supra note 133, at 3. 
 199 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(2). 
 200 Id. art. 11(7). 
 201 WCPFC, RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, Annex I, ¶ 2; see supra notes 25–30 and ac-
companying text. 
 202 WCPFC, RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 29, Annex I, ¶ 2. 
 203 See WCPFC, WCPFC-NC1-REPORT, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FIRST REGULAR SESSION OF 
THE NORTHERN COMMITTEE, DECEMBER 2005, ¶ 13, Attachment 5 (2005), available at http://www.
wcpfc.int/meetings/1st-regular-session-0, archived at http://perma.cc/86J5-BWET. 
 204 Id. 
 205 WCPFC, STATUS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 56, ¶ 1. 
 206 WCPFC Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(7). 
 207 For example, the WCPFC asked the Northern Committee to review its advice concerning the 
North Pacific albacore at its second meeting. See WCPFC, THIRD REGULAR SESSION, supra note 95, 
¶ 57. After review, the Northern Committee advised that no change in the CMM was needed. Id. 
¶ 58(a). 
2015] Bringing Southern Bluefin Tuna Back from the Brink 373 
The Northern Committee may request scientific advice from the ISC.208 In-
terestingly, neither the WCPFC nor the Scientific Committee has that authority, 
although the ISC must send any information requested by the Northern Commit-
tee directly to the WCPFC and the Scientific Committee.209 The WCPFC may 
revise its memorandum of understanding (“MoU”) with the ISC—with the ISC’s 
agreement, of course—to allow the WCPFC and the Scientific Committee to 
request information from the ISC, such as the data sets on which the ISC has 
performed stock assessments or made recommendations to the Northern Com-
mittee. In fact, two independent reviews of the WCPFC have recommended that 
the WCPFC revise this MoU to do just that.210 Nonetheless, the Scientific Com-
mittee has an important role to play in the WCPFC’s decision-making process 
with respect to all fish stocks found in the Convention Area, including northern 
stocks.  
b. The Scientific Committee’s Role in the WCPFC’s Decision-Making 
Process 
The Scientific Committee has a duty to “review the assessments, analyses, 
other work[,] and recommendations prepared for the WCPFC by the scientific 
experts” and to review the results of research and analyses of target and non-
target stocks and associated or dependent species.211 The Scientific Committee, 
thus, has a duty to review the work of the ISC, either because the ISC is a body 
of scientific experts or because the ISC conducts research and analyses on vari-
ous fish stocks in the Convention Area.212 In addition, the Scientific Committee 
has a duty to provide information, advice, and comments on that work, and to 
make reports and recommendations to the WCPFC—either at the direction of the 
WCPFC or on its own initiative—on matters concerning the conservation and 
management of, and research on, species in the Convention Area.213 
As a consequence, the Scientific Committee has the duty to review the 
work of the ISC and the Northern Committee.214 In particular, the Scientific 
Committee must review whether the information used by the Northern Commit-
tee and the ISC is based on the best scientific information available to “ensure 
that the [WCPFC] obtains for its consideration the best scientific information 
                                                                                                                           
 208 WCPFC-ISC MoU, supra note 12, at 2. 
 209 See supra notes 139–150 and accompanying text. 
 210 REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S TRANSITIONAL SCIENCE STRUCTURE, supra note 144, 
¶ 4.3.2.1; REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WCPFC, supra note 77, § 5.6. The WCPFC has not, 
however, acted upon these recommendations. 
 211 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(b), (d). 
 212 Id. art. 12(2)(d). 
 213 Id. art. 12(2)(b), (d), (g). 
 214 Id. 
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available.”215 The WCPF Convention, the WCPFC Rules of Procedure, and the 
WCPFC decisions do not define or require the WCPFC to make decisions based 
on “best scientific information available,” but the Convention does require the 
Northern Committee to make recommendations consistent with the “best scien-
tific information available” and other principles of the Convention.216 Thus, the 
Scientific Committee has the authority and the responsibility for determining 
what constitutes the “best scientific information available” generally, and for 
determining whether the WCPFC is receiving the “best available scientific in-
formation” from the ISC and the Northern Committee.217 The Scientific Com-
mittee could best include a determination of whether the information provided 
by the Northern Committee or the ISC constitutes the “best available scientific 
information” in its review of assessments and recommendations from scientific 
experts or its review of research and analyses of target and other stocks.218 In 
light of the Scientific Committee’s duty to review the ISC’s work, the WCPFC 
should defer to the advice given to it by the Scientific Committee when faced 
with uncertainty regarding measures recommended by the Northern Committee. 
The WCPF Convention does not, however, require that the WCPFC do so.219 
Moreover, the separate structure established by Article 11(7) of the WCPF 
Convention—for the Northern Committee to provide scientific and management 
advice to the WCPFC for northern stocks—does not, despite the belief of some 
WCPFC members, obviate the duty of the Scientific Committee to provide its 
own independent advice for northern stocks.220 First, although Article 11(7) pro-
vides a role for the Northern Committee with respect to northern stocks, Article 
12 explicitly directs the Scientific Committee to review the results of research 
and analyses of “target stocks or non-target or associated or dependent species in 
the Convention Area.”221 It also directs the Scientific Committee to make reports 
and recommendations to the WCPFC on matters concerning the conservation 
                                                                                                                           
 215 Id. art. 12(1). 
 216 Id. art. 11(7). Notably, the WCPFC’s resolution on best available science does not establish 
standards for what “best science information available” means. WCPFC, RESOLUTION 2012-01, RES-
OLUTION ON THE BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE (2012) [hereinafter WCPFC, RESOLUTION ON THE BEST 
AVAILABLE SCIENCE], available at https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/resolution-2012-01/resolution-best-
available-science, archived at https://perma.cc/22BA-V5W9. 
 217 See WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(7). 
 218 See id. art. 12(2)(b), (d). 
 219 For example, although WCPFC members have the obligation to use best available scientific 
information, the WCPFC itself does not. Id. art. 5. 
 220 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (quoting Japan’s views concerning the roles of the 
Scientific Committee and Northern Committee with respect to northern stocks); see also SCIENTIFIC 
COMM., NINTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 198 (reiterating Japan’s 
aforementioned views by inserting a direct quote into the summary report record of the Ninth Regular 
Session of the WCPFC). 
 221 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
2015] Bringing Southern Bluefin Tuna Back from the Brink 375 
and management of, and research on, “target stocks or non-target or associated 
or dependent species in the Convention Area.”222 In addition, the Scientific 
Committee must report its findings and conclusions on the status of “target 
stocks or non-target or associated or dependent species in the Convention Area” 
to the WCPFC.223 Nowhere does the WCPF Convention limit the authority of 
the Scientific Committee to species not under the jurisdiction of the Northern 
Committee.224 Instead, the Convention requires the Scientific Committee to re-
view species found anywhere in the Convention Area.225 
Second, the WCPF Convention does not prohibit or otherwise prevent the 
Scientific Committee from reviewing the assessments and recommendations of 
the Northern Committee or the ISC. Instead, the Convention requires the Scien-
tific Committee to “review the assessments, analyses, other work[,] and recom-
mendations” prepared by scientific experts, such as those of the ISC.226 The Sci-
entific Committee is also required to review the results of research and analyses 
of species found in the Convention Area and make reports and recommendations 
on matters concerning the conservation and management of species in the Con-
vention Area—a duty that requires the Scientific Committee to review recom-
mendations of the Northern Committee.227 Only by reviewing the recommenda-
tions of the Northern Committee, as well as the underlying science provided to 
the Northern Committee by the ISC, can the Scientific Committee fulfill its duty 
to ensure that the WCPFC obtains for its consideration the best scientific infor-
mation available. 
The review function accorded to the Scientific Committee does not under-
mine the role of the Northern Committee or eliminate the WCPFC’s duty to base 
its decisions with respect to northern stocks on recommendations of the Northern 
Committee. The WCPFC still receives recommendations for northern stocks 
from the Northern Committee and is still required to base its decisions on those 
recommendations.228 The WCPFC, however, would also have a duty to review 
the Scientific Committee’s assessment of whether the advice provided by the 
Northern Committee is based on the best scientific information available.229 If it 
is not, then the WCPFC must send the recommendation back to the Northern 
                                                                                                                           
 222 Id. art. 12(2)(g) (emphasis added). 
 223 Id. art. 12(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
 224 See, e.g., id. art. 12 (describing the functions of the Scientific Committee). 
 225 Id. art. 12(2)(d), (g). 
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 227 Id. art. 12(2)(d), (g). 
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Committee for reconsideration, according to the process described in Article 
11(7).230 
B. The Authority to Direct the Actions of Other Bodies 
The description of this legal and functional hierarchy provided above does 
not necessarily fully describe the ways in which certain bodies may or may not 
direct the actions of, or request information from, other Convention bodies. The 
WCPF Convention and the MoUs established between the WCPFC and the SPC 
and the ISC, for example, establish some limits. Based on a review of these doc-
uments, this Article makes three conclusions. First, the WCPFC has the authority 
to reject the Northern Committee’s management advice and seek reconsidera-
tion.231 Second, the WCPFC may enter into agreements with scientific experts to 
request scientific services, and it has the authority to set the terms of those 
agreements, subject to the provisions of the WCPF Convention and the mutual 
agreement of the other party involved.232 Third, the Northern Committee has the 
power to request scientific information and services from the ISC, but the 
WCPFC and the Scientific Committee currently do not.233 
1. The WCPFC’s Authority to Reject Management Advice 
The WCPFC has the ultimate authority to determine whether a recom-
mended CMM is appropriate to further the goals of the WCPF Convention.234 It 
is not required to adopt a recommendation from either the Scientific Committee 
or the Northern Committee.235 
 Although the WCPFC must adopt a CMM for the northern stocks “based 
on any recommendations” from the Northern Committee, it also has the authori-
ty to reject the recommendation.236 To reject the measure, the WCPFC must fol-
low specified rules.237 If the WCPFC rejects the Northern Committee’s advice 
and returns the matter to the Northern Committee, then the Northern Committee 
                                                                                                                           
 230 See id. art. 11(7). 
 231 Id.; see infra notes 234–243 and accompanying text. 
 232 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(5); see infra notes 246–278 and accompanying text. 
 233 WCPFC-ISC MoU, supra note 12, at 2; see infra notes 279–300 and accompanying text. 
 234 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 10(2). 
 235 Id. art. 10(5) (“The Commission shall take into account the reports and any recommendations 
of the Scientific Committee and the Technical and Compliance Committee on matters within their 
respective areas of competence.”), 11(7) (“If the Commission, in accordance with the rules of proce-
dure for decision-making on matters of substance, does not accept the recommendation of the [North-
ern] committee on any matter, it shall return the matter to the committee for further consideration.”) 
 236 Id. art. 11(7); see infra notes 238–243 and accompanying text. 
 237 See infra notes 238–243 and accompanying text. 
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“shall reconsider the matter in light of the views expressed by the Commis-
sion.”238 
Consistent with the conclusions in Part II.A above, the WCPFC may solicit 
the advice of the Scientific Committee before sending the matter back to the 
Northern Committee.239 In addition, the Scientific Committee may make rec-
ommendations to the WCPFC concerning the recommendations of the Northern 
Committee on its own accord.240 
 Moreover, the WCPFC’s obligation to base its decisions on recommenda-
tions of the Northern Committee does not require the WCPFC to adopt the 
Northern Committee’s recommendation verbatim. The Appellate Body of the 
World Trade Organization (the “Appellate Body”)—the leading international 
forum for interpreting international law over the last twenty years241—had the 
opportunity to interpret the phrase “based on” in the 2008 Hormones II dis-
pute.242 In that dispute, the Appellate Body stated that the phrase “based on” 
does not mean “conform to”; instead, the phrase “based on” implies a rational 
relationship between two things.243 
Applying the Appellate Body’s interpretation to the context of the WCPF 
Convention, the WCPFC may not ignore the recommendation of the Northern 
Committee if it decides to adopt a CMM for a northern stock, but neither must it 
adopt the recommendation without alteration.244 The WCPFC, however, must 
                                                                                                                           
 238 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(7). 
 239 Id. art. 12(2)(g); see supra notes 171–230 and accompanying text. 
 240 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(g). 
 241 As one scholar and trade lawyer notes, 
The profile of [World Trade Organization (“WTO”)] law has never been higher. Panels 
and the Appellate Body have clarified the meaning of WTO law and their jurisprudence 
has penetrated other fields of international economic law and international law in gen-
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Appellate Body, has become “an international tribunal of historic global achievement.” 
ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY 3 (2009). 
 242 Appellate Body Report, United StatesContinued Suspension of Obligations in the EC
Hormones Dispute, ¶ 528, WT/DS320/AB/R (adopted Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Appellate Body 
Report, Hormones Dispute]. The Appellate Body was interpreting Article 5.1 of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, known as the SPS Agreement. VAN DAMME, 
supra note 241, at 3. The SPS Agreement sets forth rules for the establishment and implementation of 
“SPS measures” such as food safety requirements. Id. Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement requires SPS 
measures to be “based on” a risk assessment. Id. The WTO Appellate Body noted that, 
This does not mean that SPS measure have to “conform to” the risk assessment. In-
stead, “the results of the risk assessment must sufficiently warrant—that is to say, rea-
sonably support—the SPS measure at stake.” Put differently, there must be a “rational 
relationship” between the SPS measure and the risk assessment. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 243 Appellate Body Report, Hormones Dispute, supra note 242, ¶ 528. 
 244 Id. 
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adopt a CMM that bears some rational relationship to the Northern Committee’s 
recommendation.245 
2. The WCPFC’s Authority to Enter into Agreements with Independent 
Bodies 
The WCPF Convention includes four different provisions that allow the 
WCPFC to enter into relationships with independent bodies.246 Because the pro-
visions are largely redundant, it is difficult to determine exactly how they differ. 
Nonetheless, they clearly provide the WCPFC with authority to enter into ar-
rangements to obtain a wide array of information from bodies outside the WCPF 
Convention regime—authority that the WCPFC has used to enter into arrange-
ments with the SPC and the ISC.247 Of course, because any arrangement is sub-
ject to mutual agreement, the WCPFC may not direct independent bodies to un-
dertake specific activities. The agreements could, however, establish an open-
ended invitation for one of the WCPF Convention’s bodies to request infor-
mation from a non-WCPF Convention body. 
a. Defining the WCPFC’s Authority to Enter into Agreements 
Article 9(5) of the WCPF Convention includes the first grant of authority to 
the WCPFC to enter into agreements with independent bodies.248 Article 9(5) 
allows the WCPFC to “enter into contractual arrangements with relevant institu-
tions to provide expert services necessary for the efficient functioning of the 
Commission and to enable it to carry out effectively its responsibilities under 
[the] Convention.”249 It does not stipulate that the expert services must be of a 
scientific nature, but it does not preclude such services.250 
The second grant of authority, in Article 13(1), allows the WCPFC to “en-
ter into administrative and financial arrangements” to “engage the services of 
scientific experts to provide information and advice on the fishery resource cov-
ered by this WCPF Convention and related matters that may be relevant to the 
conservation and management of those resources.”251 Article 13 does not specify 
whether or how “contractual arrangements” identified in Article 9(5) differ from 
“administrative and financial arrangements” of Article 13(1).252 Article 13(1) 
                                                                                                                           
 245 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(7). 
 246 Id. arts. 9(5), 13(1), 22(2), 22(5). 
 247 WCPFC-ISC MoU, supra note 12; WCPFC-SPC MoU, supra note 133. 
 248 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(5). 
 249 Id. (emphasis added). 
 250 See id. 
 251 Id. art. 13(1) (emphasis added). 
 252 See id. art. 13. 
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makes clear, however, that the scientific experts are not limited to individuals.253 
Thus, the WCPF Convention leaves open the possibility that the WCPFC could 
consult with the SPC and/or the ISC under Article 13(1).254 
Article 13(1) more precisely specifies the role experts may play than Article 
9(5). As directed by the WCPFC and in support of the WCPFC’s work, scientific 
experts may (a) conduct scientific research and analyses, (b) develop and rec-
ommend to the WCPFC and the Scientific Committee stock-specific reference 
points, (c) assess the status of stocks against the reference points established by 
the WCPFC, (d) provide the WCPFC and the Scientific Committee with reports 
on the results of their scientific work, advice, and “recommendations in support 
of the formulation of [CMMs] and other relevant matters,”255 and (e) perform 
other specified tasks.256 In providing these services, the scientific experts may 
compile fisheries data and may conduct assessments of fish stocks, impacts of 
various factors (including fishing and other human or environmental factors) on 
fish stocks, and the impacts of proposed fishing and management changes, 
among other things.257 
The WCPF Convention, however, provides several important checks on the 
information provided by Article 13(1) scientific experts. For example, it allows 
the WCPFC to arrange for peer review of this information and advice.258 In addi-
tion, the scientific experts must provide all of their reports and recommendations 
to the Scientific Committee and the WCPFC.259 The Scientific Committee must 
then review such reports and recommendations prior to the WCPFC’s considera-
tion of them, and “provide information, advice and comments” on this infor-
mation “if necessary.”260 
The third grant of authority, in Article 22(2), authorizes the WCPFC to 
make “suitable arrangements for consultation, cooperation[,] and collaboration 
with other relevant intergovernmental organizations” that can help the WCPF 
Convention meet its objectives, including with other tuna-related bodies.261 The 
phrase “suitable arrangements” would seem to include both the “contractual ar-
rangements” and “administrative and financial arrangements” covered by Arti-
cles 9(5) and 13(1), respectively. Moreover, Articles 9 and 13 allow “contractual 
                                                                                                                           
 253 The WCPFC must “to the greatest extent possible, utilize the services of existing regional 
organizations and . . . consult, as appropriate, with any other fisheries management, technical or scien-
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 260 Id. art. 12(2)(b). 
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arrangements” and “administrative and financial arrangements” with other or-
ganizations, including tuna-related bodies.262 As a result, Article 22(2) appears 
redundant.263 
The fourth grant of authority, in Article 22(5), authorizes the WCPFC to en-
ter into “relationship agreements” with “other organizations . . . with a view to 
obtaining the best available scientific and other fisheries related information to 
further the attainment of the objective of this Convention.”264 Notably, Article 
22(5) specifically authorizes the WCPFC to enter into a “relationship agree-
ment” with the SPC.265 The WCPF Convention, however, is again silent as to 
whether and how “relationship agreements” differ from other types of arrange-
ments the WCPFC may establish.266 
b. Implementing the WCPFC’s Authority to Enter into Arrangements 
Using its authority to enter into arrangements, the WCPFC has entered into 
agreements with both the SPC and the ISC. In fact, the WCPFC has entered into 
several agreements with the SPC, including the MoU that outlines the general 
types of scientific services that the SPC provides to the WCPFC,267 an accompa-
nying triennial service agreement,268 and a separate data exchange agreement.269 
The WCPFC has also adopted an MoU with the ISC to provide, at the request of 
the Northern Committee, scientific information and advice to the Northern 
Committee.270 
The WCPFC entered into the MoU with the SPC to take advantage of the 
SPC’s extensive database and array of scientific information.271 Under the 2010 
to 2012 triennial services agreement between the WCPFC and the SPC, the SPC 
                                                                                                                           
 262 Id. arts. 9(5), 13. 
 263 See id. 
 264 Id. art. 22(5). 
 265 Article 22(5) of the Convention states: 
The Commission may enter into relationship agreements with the organizations referred 
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 266 See id. 
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 268 Id. at Annex I. 
 269 Data Exchange Agreement, WCPFC-Secretariat of the Pac. Cmty, Aug. 27, 2009, available at 
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7YUR-MCVM. 
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agreed to provide data management, statistical analysis, stock assessments, man-
agement analyses, ecosystem analyses, capacity building of small island devel-
oping states, research services, and other advisory and technical services.272 The 
SPC also compiles data upon which the WCPFC bases its management deci-
sions.273 The SPC receives data from both WCPFC members and SPC mem-
bers.274 It then compiles this data into stock assessments and research reports 
that it provides directly to the Scientific Committee.275 In light of these tasks, an 
Independent Review of the WCPFC’s Transitional Science Structure and Func-
tions notes that the SPC is the WCPFC’s “chief scientific services provider” as 
well as its data service provider.276 
The WCPFC’s MoU with the ISC is more limited, focusing on providing 
scientific information and advice on northern stocks to the Northern Commit-
tee.277 The ISC “enhance[es] scientific research and cooperation for conservation 
and rational utilization of tuna and tuna-like species in the North Pacific 
Ocean.”278 It uses this expertise to provide scientific information and advice to 
the Northern Committee. 
3. Northern Committee’s Authority to Request Information from the ISC 
As noted in Part I.C.2, the Northern Committee “may request from the ISC 
scientific information and advice regarding fish stocks (generally [the northern 
stocks]) for response prior to each meeting of the Northern Committee.”279 In 
2013, for example, the Northern Committee requested a range of information 
from the ISC relating to rebuilding stocks of Pacific bluefin tuna.280 The ISC 
must provide the requested information to the Northern Committee, the Scien-
tific Committee, and the WCPFC.281 
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 274 REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S TRANSITIONAL SCIENCE STRUCTURE, supra note 144, ¶ 3.3. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. ¶¶ 3.1, 3.3. 
 277 WCPFC-ISC MoU, supra note 12, at pt. I. 
 278 REPORT OF THE PEER REVIEW OF FUNCTION, supra note 141, § 2.1. 
 279 WCPFC-ISC MoU, supra note 12, at pt. I, ¶ 1. The agreement states that species for which the 
Northern Committee may request reoccurring advice from the ISC include North Pacific albacore, 
Pacific bluefin tuna, swordfish and other billfishes, and bycatch (fish and non-fish species). Id. Annex 
1. 
 280 N. COMM., NINTH REGULAR SESSION SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 115, at Attachment F. 
 281 WCPFC-ISC MoU, supra note 12, at pt. I, ¶¶ 1, 2. 
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4. The WCPFC’s and Scientific Committee’s Authority to Request 
Information from the ISC 
Although the Northern Committee may request information from the ISC, 
neither the Scientific Committee nor the WCPFC may request information from 
the ISC pursuant to the MoU between the WCPFC and the ISC.282 This ar-
rangement is problematic because the Scientific Committee is precluded from 
requesting information it needs to review the assessments and recommendations 
of the ISC, consistent with its duties under Article 12,283 including determining 
whether the information the ISC is using is the best scientific information avail-
able.284 As the subsidiary body charged with reviewing the work of the ISC and 
with ensuring that the WCPFC obtains the best scientific information available, 
the Scientific Committee should have the authority to seek information from the 
ISC. In addition, the data used by the ISC in its stock assessments is not held by 
the WCPFC or the SPC;285 it remains with the ISC or its members, and is conse-
quently not subject to independent analysis by the Scientific Committee.286 As 
such, the Scientific Committee has been “asked to approve the stock assessments 
of the ISC and its advice resulting from these . . . but without the ability to fully 
review the stock assessments.”287 
Three separate independent assessments underscored the need for the 
WCPFC and the Scientific Committee to be able to request information from the 
                                                                                                                           
 282 See id. at pt. I (laying out guidance for the provision of scientific advice in the MoU between 
the WCPFC and the ISC). 
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Northern Committee. The Review of the Performance of the WCPFC expressed 
its concern that the current framework “prevents a more fluent dialogue between 
the Commission and the Scientific Committee with the ISC.”288 As a result, it 
recommended changes to the MoU to allow direct exchanges of scientific infor-
mation among the ISC, the Scientific Committee, and the WCPFC.289 
The WCPFC’s Independent Review of the Commission’s Transitional Sci-
ence Structure and Functions (the “Independent Review”) noted the concern of 
“many” WCPFC members “over the lack of satisfactory review of ISC assess-
ments by the [Scientific Committee] and the perceived closed nature of ISC as-
sessment meetings.”290 The Independent Review also suggested that confidence 
in the ISC’s assessments is undermined because, 
[M]ost [Scientific Committee] participants are not able to be present 
at the ISC stock assessment working groups, working papers present-
ed to the working groups are not readily available, the data used in as-
sessments are not accessible outside of the working groups, and there 
“is insufficient detail in reports to review the assessments in detail at 
the [Scientific Committee] meeting.”291  
Although no one questioned the scientific quality of the assessments, several 
WCPFC members emphasized the need for additional review by the Scientific 
Committee, external peer review, transparency, and validation.292 
Further, the ISC’s Report of Peer Review of Function293 (the “Peer Re-
view”) repeatedly warned that the “ISC must stay above the political fray and 
maintain a strong science focus.”294 The Peer Review acknowledged the ISC’s 
recent successes, but also its “setbacks that have the potential to seriously erode 
the scientific credibility of the organization.”295 It cautioned that “ISC scientists 
should strictly provide science, the core information to write management plans, 
but should not be involved in writing them.”296 Moreover, it warned against the 
reliability and accuracy of the ISC’s data, stating that “[p]ersonal or institutional 
opinions do not constitute [best available scientific information]” and that 
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“[d]ata that form the basis of stock assessments must absolutely be supported by 
scientific documentation of substance.”297 In addition, the Peer Review stated 
that “[t]here is great need to improve the evaluation of the accuracy and preci-
sion of input parameters and indices that are currently followed.”298 It stated that 
“[t]he process of independent stock assessment reviews will require improved 
documentation . . . especially in data review . . . .” and that “[m]ore consistency 
is required in the quality of peer reviewers for stock assessment reviews that in-
clude more experts with sufficient knowledge of tunas and tuna stock assessment 
methodologies.”299 The Peer Review thus suggested that the ISC standardize 
statistical analyses and methods across working groups, provide third party train-
ing, improve transparency, and standardize data.300 
All of this suggests that the WCPFC’s MoU with the ISC needs to be re-
vised to ensure that the Scientific Committee and the WCPFC have the authority 
to request information from the ISC. In this way, transparency and confidence in 
the ISC assessments will be improved and the WCPFC can be assured that it is 
receiving recommendations based on the best scientific information available. 
III. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AMONG INSTITUTIONS AND MEMBERS 
With tensions rising and disputes intensifying over decision-making author-
ity, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (“WCPFC”) and its 
members might choose to seek formal ways to resolve their disagreements. The 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western Pacific Ocean (“WCPF Convention” or the “Convention”) 
allows members to resolve their disagreements in several ways. Section A of this 
Part assesses whether a subsidiary body or a member may reject or seek review 
of a legal interpretation with which it disagrees.301 As described in Section B of 
this Part, members may, as a last resort, use the WCPF Convention’s dispute set-
tlement procedures if an agreement cannot be reached.302 Finally, Section C of 
this Part reviews disputes in other similarly situated multi-stakeholder interna-
tional management regimes to identify solutions and best practices for resolving 
disagreements.303 
                                                                                                                           
 297 Id. ¶ 4.3. 
 298 Id. ¶ 3.2. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. ¶ 5.0. 
 301 See infra notes 304–337 and accompanying text. 
 302 See infra notes 338–388 and accompanying text. 
 303 See infra notes 389–422 and accompanying text. 
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A. Disagreements on Legal Interpretation of WCPF Convention  
Policy or Procedure 
As a general matter, the WCPFC retains absolute authority over the inter-
pretation of WCPF Convention policy or procedure.304 Thus, if the WCPFC in-
terprets a provision of the WCPF Convention through a binding conservation 
and management measure (“CMM”), the subsidiary bodies and the individual 
members may not reject it or substitute their own legal interpretation.305 For ex-
ample, the WCPFC has adopted a CMM that creates a narrow set of exemp-
tions306 from the prohibition against transshipment at sea by purse seine ves-
sels.307 Each member bears the responsibility to implement and enforce such 
measures as adopted.308 They may not carve out, in the case of transshipment, an 
exemption not established in the CMM.309 
As exemplified by the disputes over bluefin tuna and blue shark, disagree-
ments over legal interpretation might arise in at least three different ways. First, 
members or the WCPFC might lack a clear understanding and interpretation of a 
provision of the WCPF Convention or of a memorandum of understanding 
(“MoU”) or another document relevant to the implementation of the WCPF 
Convention and its CMMs. Second, an individual member might disagree with 
an interpretation of the WCPF Convention adopted by the WCPFC. Third, the 
WCPFC might not agree with a recommendation of the Northern Committee. As 
described below, these disagreements can be addressed by (1) seeking a legal 
opinion and adopting a common understanding through a decision or CMM, (2) 
                                                                                                                           
 304 See generally WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 9. 
The Commission shall have international legal personality and such legal capacity as 
[might] be necessary to perform its functions and achieve its objectives. The privileges 
and immunities which the Commission and its officers shall enjoy in the territory of a 
Contracting Party shall be determined by agreement between the Commission and the 
member concerned. 
Id. 
 305 CMMs are binding on the Parties, and the WCPF Convention does not allow a member to opt 
out of them. Id. art. 22(5). 
 306 WCPFC, CMM 2009-06, CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURE ON THE REGULA-
TION OF TRANSSHIPMENT § 2, ¶ 25 (2009), available at https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2009-
06/conservation-and-management-measure-regulation-transhipment-0, archived at https://perma.cc/
5563-UTRE. 
 307 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 29(5). A purse seine vessel uses purse seines to catch 
fish. Fishing Gear Types: Purse Seines, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.
fao.org/fishery/geartype/249/en (last visited Mar. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/HSM7-
KLPD. A purse seine is a long wall of netting set vertically in the water. Id. A purse seine vessel en-
circles fish with the net. Id. The net includes gear that allows it to close at the bottom and the top so 
when the fish are finally enclosed, the net looks like a purse. Id. 
 308 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(j). 
 309 Id. art. 37. 
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using the review procedure under Article 20 of the WCPF Convention, and (3) 
rejecting a recommendation of the Northern Committee and requesting recon-
sideration of the matter. A fourth option, requesting the Technical and Compli-
ance Committee to review the dispute, does not appear to be viable. 
1. Seeking a Legal Opinion and Adopting a Common Understanding 
If the provisions of the WCPF Convention or a CMM are unclear, the 
members may, of course, clarify the meaning of terms by adopting an official 
interpretation.310 This practice has been widely used in many multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements. For example, the parties to the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”)311 have 
defined “personal and household effects,”312 “hunting trophy,”313 and many oth-
er terms through resolutions of the parties.314 The parties to the U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) have established entire mecha-
nisms based on single words or phrases used in the UNFCCC.315 As noted 
above, the WCPFC has used official interpretations to define a narrow set of ex-
emptions from the ban on transshipment at sea by purse seine vessels.316 
Similarly, the WCPFC could adopt a decision that clearly elaborates on the 
role of the Scientific Committee vis-à-vis the Northern Committee and the 
ISC.317 In the alternative, the WCPFC could rewrite the MoU between the 
WCPFC and the ISC and the terms of reference for the Northern Committee. 
Given, however, that others have made the same recommendation without the 
                                                                                                                           
 310 The WCPFC has the authority to “discuss any question or matter within the Competence of 
the Commission and adopt any measures or recommendations necessary for achieving the objective of 
this Convention.” Id. art. 10(1)(o). 
 311 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, Mar. 3, 
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES] (entered into force on July 1, 1975). 
 312 CITES, RESOLUTION CONF. 13.7 (REV. COP16), CONTROL OF TRADE IN PERSONAL AND 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS (2004), available at http://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/res/13/E-Res-13-
07R16.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CU35-ZEQ7. 
 313 CITES, RESOLUTION CONF. 12.3 (REV. COP16), PERMITS AND CERTIFICATES (2002). 
 314 See, e.g., CITES, RESOLUTION CONF. 10.10 (REV. COP16), TRADE IN ELEPHANT SPECIMENS 
(1997), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/10/10-10R16.php, archived at http://perma.cc/
87ML-L3ZP (defining “raw ivory” and establishing special mechanisms for controlling illegal trade in 
ivory and poaching of African elephants). 
 315 For example, the Parties have defined “afforestation,” “reforestation,” and “deforestation,” and 
then created accounting rules for determining greenhouse emissions from these activities. See Rep. of 
the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), 1st 
Session, Nov. 28–Dec. 10, 2005, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, 16/CMP.1, at 3, available 
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a03.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KT5V-PEE5 
(containing CMP decision on “Land use, land-use change[,] and forestry”). 
 316 WCPFC, CMM ON REGULATION OF TRANSSHIPMENT, supra note 306, § 2, ¶ 25. 
 317 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 10(1)(c). 
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WCPFC acting,318 the WCPFC is unlikely to reach consensus to make these 
changes.  
The WCPFC does have other options that may help it reach consensus. In 
the same way that it requested a review of the WCPF Convention319 and its sci-
ence arrangements,320 the WCPFC could seek a legal interpretation, either from 
the WCPFC’s legal officer or from an independent consultant. To implement this 
approach, the WCPFC must first adopt a decision to seek a legal interpretation of 
the WCPF Convention’s provisions. Based on that legal interpretation, the 
WCPFC would then adopt a second decision articulating its own legal interpreta-
tion, preferably by consensus, but if consensus cannot be achieved, then by a 
three-fourths majority vote.321 
2. Reviewing a WCPFC Decision Under Article 20(6) 
When the WCPFC adopts a legal interpretation, as described above, or a 
CMM, the WCPF Convention allows a member to seek a review of the decision 
under limited circumstances.322 Article 20(6) allows a member that voted against 
a decision or that was absent during the meeting in which the WCPFC adopted 
the decision to seek a review of the decision by a review panel.323 To initiate a 
review, a member must submit a written request for review to the WCPFC’s Ex-
ecutive Director within thirty days of the adoption of the decision.324 The request 
must allege that the decision is inconsistent with the WCPF Convention or “un-
                                                                                                                           
 318 REPORT OF THE ISC PEER REVIEW OF FUNCTION, supra note 114, ¶ 5.6; REVIEW OF THE 
COMMISSION’S TRANSITIONAL SCIENCE STRUCTURE, supra note 116, ¶ 5.2.2.2. 
 319 REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WCPFC, supra note 77. The WCPFC agreed to con-
duct a performance review at its fifth regular session. WCPFC, FIFTH REGULAR SESSION ¶¶ 283–286 
(2009), available at https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC5%20%5BSummary%20Report%20-
%20Final%204May2009%5D.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/2ELL-LGZA. 
 320 REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S TRANSITIONAL SCIENCE STRUCTURE, supra note 144. The 
WCPFC agreed to conduct a review of the science arrangements at its fourth regular session. WCPFC, 
FOURTH REGULAR SESSION ¶ 108 (2007), available at https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPF
4%20Summary%20Report%20and%20Attachments.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/89V6-CU5E. 
 321 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 20(2). The percentage of the vote is determined based on 
“those [members, cooperating non-members, and participating territories (collectively, CCMs)] pre-
sent and voting.” Id. In addition, the three-fourths majority must represent three-fourths of those 
CCMs that are also members of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency and three-fourths of the 
CCMs that are not. Id. The decision to seek a legal interpretation might be considered a “procedural 
matter” requiring only a simple majority, although if the CCMs disagree as to whether an issue is 
substantive or procedural, then they must treat the issue as one of substance requiring a three-fourths 
majority. Id. 
 322 Id. art. 20(6). 
 323 Id. The review panel will consist of three members chosen from a list of experts in the field of 
fisheries drawn up and maintained by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization or a 
similar list maintained by the WCPFC’s Executive Director. Id. Annex II(1). 
 324 Id. art. 20(6), Annex II(1). 
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justifiably discriminates in form or in fact against the member concerned.”325 
For example, if the WCPFC adopts a decision based on a recommendation of the 
Northern Committee without a review by the Scientific Committee, a member 
might have an argument that the decision was made inconsistently with the re-
quirements of the WCPF Convention because the Scientific Committee is obli-
gated to make reports and recommendations to the WCPFC on matters concern-
ing the conservation and management of, and research on, target and non-target 
stocks in the Convention Area.326 
Once the member submits the request, “no member of the Commission 
shall be required to give effect to the decision in question” until the review panel 
provides its findings and recommendations.327 If the review panel agrees with 
the WCPFC’s decision, the decision becomes binding in thirty days from when 
the Executive Director communicates the review panel’s findings.328 If, however, 
the review panel recommends that the decision be modified, amended, or re-
voked, the WCPFC must modify or amend the decision to conform to the panel’s 
recommendation at the WCPFC’s next annual meeting.329 The WCPFC may also 
decide to revoke the decision with written requests from a majority of the mem-
bers at a special meeting within sixty days from when the Executive Director 
communicates the panel’s findings.330  
3. Requesting the Northern Committee to Reconsider a Matter 
The Northern Committee may recommend a measure for a northern stock 
based on its own interpretation of the WCPF Convention (assuming the WCPFC 
has not adopted its own interpretation of the relevant provision) or the relevant 
science.331 As noted above, the WCPFC retains the authority to return “any mat-
ter” to the Northern Committee, including the underlying legal interpretation 
used by the Northern Committee.332 In such a case, the WCPFC may also seek 
advice from the Scientific Committee, given the Scientific Committee’s broad 
duty to provide reports and recommendations on matters concerning conserva-
tion and management of species in the Convention Area, review assessments and 
other work of the ISC, and ensure that the WCPFC obtains the best scientific 
information available.333 In cases where the WCPFC rejects the Northern Com-
                                                                                                                           
 325 Id. art. 20(6)(a)–(b). 
 326 See id. art. 12(2)(g). 
 327 Id. art. 20(7). 
 328 Id. art. 20(8). 
 329 Id. art. 20(9). 
 330 Id. 
 331 Id. art. 11(7). 
 332 Id. 
 333 Id. art. 12(1), (2)(b). 
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mittee’s recommendation, the Northern Committee shall reconsider the matter in 
light of the WCPFC’s views.334 
4. Requesting the Technical and Compliance Committee to Address the Issue 
The Technical and Compliance Committee is charged with providing tech-
nical advice and recommendations relating to the implementation of, and com-
pliance with, CMMs.335 This provision could, in theory, allow the Technical and 
Compliance Committee to respond to concerns that the Scientific Committee is 
not providing advice on recommendations provided by the Northern Committee 
or is not allowed to seek information from the ISC. This matter appears to be 
within the mandate of the Technical and Compliance Committee, as the failure 
of the Scientific Committee to make recommendations or obtain information 
relates to implementation of CMMs adopted without the Scientific Committee’s 
consideration. 
Nonetheless, getting the matter resolved—or even considered—by the 
Technical and Compliance Committee appears challenging. First, matters cov-
ered by the Review of the Performance of the WCPFC, such as clarifying the 
respective roles of the Scientific Committee, and the ISC in providing advice 
and information to the Northern Committee and the WCPFC, have been delegat-
ed to the Scientific Committee rather than the Technical and Compliance Com-
mittee.336 
 Second, it seems unlikely that implementation of a specific CMM would 
trigger a discussion of whether the WCPFC should have based its decision on 
the views of the Scientific Committee or whether the Scientific Committee 
should be allowed to request information from the ISC. 
What might be possible is for the Technical and Compliance Committee to 
compare, within its discussion of the status of fisheries, actual catches versus 
hypothetical catches had the WCPFC adopted the recommendation of the Scien-
tific Committee. Even if the Technical and Compliance Committee recommend-
ed that the WCPFC adopt the advice of the Scientific Committee, the WCPFC is 
under no obligation to adopt the Technical and Compliance Committee’s rec-
ommendation—just as it is under no obligation to adopt the Scientific Commit-
tee’s recommendation in the first place.337 
                                                                                                                           
 334 Id. art. 11(7). 
 335 Id. art. 14(1)(a). 
 336 SECRETARIAT OF THE WCPFC, WCPFC-TCC8-2012/20_REV 1, RECOMMENDATIONS FROM 
THE WCPFC PERFORMANCE REVIEW 33 (2012). As such, this issue is expressly excluded from the 
Technical and Compliance Committee. WCPFC, WCPFC-TCC9-2013-20, MATRIX OF RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FROM THE WCPFC PERFORMANCE REVIEW FOR TCC TO CONSIDER (2013). 
 337 See supra notes 234–243 and accompanying text. 
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B. Dispute Settlement Procedures 
When the WCPFC does not officially adopt an interpretation of the WCPF 
Convention policy or procedure, disputes about such interpretation could arise 
among the members if they feel their interests are compromised by a CMM. The 
WCPF Convention does not provide its own dispute settlement provisions. In-
stead, it directs members to resolve their disputes using the dispute settlement 
provisions of the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement (the “Fish Stocks Agreement”), 
regardless of whether the member is also party to the Fish Stocks Agreement.338 
The Fish Stocks Agreement mandates that members “cooperate in order to pre-
vent disputes” through non-adversarial processes such as negotiation or media-
tion.339 If the dispute becomes intractable, however, members also have the op-
tion to use the arbitration or dispute settlement provisions of the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention (“UNCLOS”)340 because the Fish Stocks Agreement 
expressly incorporates the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS.341 Alt-
hough none of these procedures have been invoked by WCPFC members, they 
could be used in the future to resolve questions concerning the provision of sci-
entific advice to the WCPFC. 
1. Negotiation, Mediation, and Conciliation 
Consistent with other international agreements, whether relating to trade,342 
environment,343 or other matters,344 the WCPF Convention seeks to resolve dis-
                                                                                                                           
 338 WCPF Convention, supra note 1, art. 31. 
 339 U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 49, arts. 27–28. 
 340 The UNCLOS establishes “a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world’s oceans 
and seas establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources. It enshrines the notion 
that all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed as a whole.” United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Overview and Full Text, UNITED 
NATIONS OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_overview_convention.htm (last updated Aug. 22, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/
P38S-ES64. 
 341 UNCLOS, supra note 75, art. 30(2) (identifying the dispute settlement provisions of Part XV 
of UNCLOS as applying mutatis mutandis to disputes relating to highly migratory and straddling fish 
stocks governed by regional agreements). 
 342 See, e.g., CITES, supra note 311, art. XVIII (directing the disputing parties to resolve their 
dispute through negotiation before seeking arbitration). 
 343 The World Trade Organization’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes directs disputing parties to resolve their dispute through consultations, good 
offices conciliation, and mediation before seeking the establishment of a panel to resolve the dispute. 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2 Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes arts. 4, 5, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 154 
(1994). 
 344 See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction art. 10, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 (entered 
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putes through non-adversarial means. For example, the WCPF Convention, 
through the Fish Stocks Agreement, directs the members to attempt to resolve 
their disputes through “negotiation, inquiry, mediation, [or] conciliation.”345 
Neither the Fish Stocks Agreement nor UNCLOS provide specific proce-
dures for conducting negotiations. Nonetheless, WCPFC members might prefer 
negotiation to other dispute settlement approaches because negotiations are the 
least formal and the least resource-intensive process. When parties negotiate, 
they can converse informally and confidentially because the process does not 
involve a third party. Moreover, the parties might favor the flexibility to reach a 
mutually acceptable result tailored to the concerns and interests of parties repre-
senting different viewpoints. In other words, they can create a settlement that is 
not a “win” for one set of members and a “loss” for another set of members. 
Mediation and conciliation draw on the expertise of a third party to act as a 
sounding board for the disputing parties and perhaps also to recommend solu-
tions to the parties.346 Again, neither the Fish Stocks Agreement nor UNCLOS 
provide specific procedures for conducting mediation and conciliation, although 
UNCLOS does include guidance on conducting conciliation.347 With both medi-
ation and conciliation, the record of the proceedings typically remains confiden-
tial—unless the parties agree otherwise—and the recommendations of the medi-
ator or conciliator are non-binding.348 
Because UNCLOS prefers conciliation to other compulsory procedures,349 
disputing parties are encouraged to resolve the dispute through the conciliation 
process provided in UNCLOS or another conciliation process.350 For the concili-
ation procedure to apply to members, the disputing members must accept the 
invitation and agree upon a conciliation procedure.351 Once the parties agree on 
the procedure, any party may submit the dispute to that procedure,352 and the 
parties must follow the procedure to terminate the dispute.353 If, however, the 
                                                                                                                           
into force Mar. 1, 1999) (stating that parties “shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any 
dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention”). 
 345 U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 49, art. 27. 
 346 Mediation and conciliation are often used interchangeably, although some consider concilia-
tion to be more formal than mediation. See Linda C. Reif, Conciliation as a Mechanism for the Reso-
lution of International Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 578, 584 (1990) 
(stating that “[a] mediation is more informal and the mediator, when making proposals, is expected to 
construct them based purely on the information provided by the parties”). 
 347 UNCLOS, supra note 75, art. 284, Annex V. Although the disputing parties may determine 
the procedures for conducting the conciliation, UNCLOS provisions describe the composition of the 
conciliation commission, payment of fees, and other aspects of conciliation. Id. 
 348 Reif, supra note 346, at 586. 
 349 UNCLOS, supra note 75, art. 286. 
 350 Id. art. 284(1). 
 351 Id. art. 284(2). 
 352 Id. 
 353 Id. art. 284(3). 
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disputing members do not accept the invitation or the parties cannot agree on a 
conciliation procedure, “the conciliation proceedings shall be deemed to be ter-
minated,” and the members must use another form of dispute settlement.354 
Under the UNCLOS conciliation procedure, a conciliation commission is 
created to reach “an amicable settlement” among the disputing parties.355 The 
conciliation commission consists of five members: two appointed conciliators 
from each of the disputing parties, and a chairman appointed by the other four 
conciliators.356 Upon examining each party’s claims and objections, the concilia-
tion commission makes proposals to the parties.357 Although the conciliation 
commission’s recommendations are not binding on the parties,358 the parties can 
accept a recommendation to terminate the conciliation proceedings.359 If, how-
ever, one party rejects the recommendation by written notification to the U.N. 
Secretary-General, the conciliation process is terminated.360 
2. Ad Hoc Expert Panels 
Although negotiation, mediation, and conciliation are traditional forms of 
non-adversarial dispute settlement, the Fish Stocks Agreement also provides for 
a less well-known approach: the use of an ad hoc expert panel.361 Under the Fish 
Stocks Agreement, a member may choose to resolve a dispute that “concerns a 
matter of a technical nature” through an ad hoc expert panel.362 Acting as an un-
biased third party in a non-binding process, the expert panel “confer[s]” with the 
disputing parties with the aim of resolving the dispute.363 Although the Fish 
Stocks Agreement does not define “a matter of a technical nature,”364 its lan-
guage indicates that the use of an ad hoc panel is preferred to binding methods of 
dispute settlement—e.g., judicial settlement—because it reserves compulsory 
procedures to situations where the parties cannot reach a settlement through non-
binding decisions.365 
                                                                                                                           
 354 Id. art. 284(4). 
 355 Id. Annex V, art. 6. 
 356 Id. Annex V, art. 3(a)–(d). 
 357 Id. Annex V, art. 6. The commission submits its recommendations and conclusions in a report 
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 358 Id. Annex V, art. 7(2). 
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Within the context of the WCPF Convention, if a matter concerns any issue 
within the areas of competence of the Scientific Committee or the Technical and 
Compliance Committee, a member could legitimately argue that such matter is 
“of a technical nature” that requires the expertise of an ad hoc panel. If the ad 
hoc expert panel process is used to resolve the dispute over the provision of sci-
entific advice in the WCPFC, the expert panel should consist of independent 
experts rather than members from the WCPFC’s subsidiary bodies to ensure an 
unbiased resolution to the dispute.  
3. Arbitration and Judicial Settlement 
If members cannot resolve their dispute through conciliation or negotiation, 
they might find that a binding procedure is necessary to resolve the dispute. 
Though formal international proceedings are rare and contentious, they might be 
the only viable option for members to reach a settlement. In such a case, the 
members also have the option to submit the dispute to one of four tribunals or 
courts: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”),366 the Inter-
national Court of Justice (“ICJ”),367 an arbitral tribunal,368 or a special arbitral 
tribunal.369 The dispute, however, must be submitted to the arbitral tribunal un-
less the disputing parties have agreed on, or accepted, the same procedure for 
dispute settlement.370 In addition, the court or the tribunal may select two or 
more scientific experts to sit with the court or tribunal, without having the right 
to vote on disputes involving “scientific or technical matters.”371 
Because members may agree to submit to the jurisdiction of a court or tri-
bunal they have not accepted through ratification of UNCLOS, disputing mem-
bers might consider different characteristics of these courts and tribunals when 
deciding whether to submit to a court or tribunal’s jurisdiction. Members seeking 
more control over the dispute resolution procedure might opt to submit to one of 
the arbitral tribunals because of the tribunals’ greater flexibility compared to IT-
LOS and ICJ procedures.372 For example, when members submit a dispute to an 
                                                                                                                           
 366 This tribunal must be established in accordance with Annex VI of UNCLOS. Id. art. 287(1)(a). 
 367 Id. art. 287(1)(b). 
 368 This tribunal must be established in accordance with Annex VII of UNCLOS. Id. art. 
287(1)(c). 
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 370 Id. art. 287(4)–(5). 
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289. 
 372 Samuel J. Zeidman, Note, Sittin’ on the Dhaka the Bay: The Dispute Between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar and Its Implications for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 50 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 442, 479 (2012). 
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arbitral tribunal, they have control over the composition of the tribunal.373 In 
addition, they have more control over the questions addressed to the tribunal by 
avoiding third party interventions.374 On the other hand, if members cannot agree 
on the dispute settlement procedure, then they might elect to submit the dispute 
to the ITLOS or the ICJ and their established procedures.375 
Although ITLOS has judges with extensive knowledge of law, some com-
mentators have voiced concern that ITLOS judges might only have expertise in 
the law of the sea rather than in international law generally.376 ITLOS judges, 
however, have shown their ability to consider a range of issues covering differ-
ent aspects of international law.377 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, for ex-
ample, the ITLOS tribunal adeptly considered principles of international law and 
issues relating to specific provisions of UNCLOS and the Convention for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (“CCSBT”).378 In addition, members 
might decide to bring the dispute to the ITLOS instead of the ICJ because the 
ITLOS has fewer cases pending before it, allowing for quicker adjudication.379 
4. Provisional Measures 
If members decide to submit the dispute to a court or tribunal, the formal 
nature of such proceedings could lead to a protracted dispute.380 Such a drawn 
out period of time can be problematic in the context of WCPF Convention dis-
putes. For example, if members are disputing a decision that allows unsustaina-
ble harvest of a fish stock, then a drawn out dispute settlement process could 
cause great harm to the fish stocks. 
To “prevent serious harm to the marine environment,” UNCLOS allows a 
disputing member to request provisional measures, including a court or tribunal 
imposed injunction of the decision under dispute.381 In fact, upon receiving such 
                                                                                                                           
 373 NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 56 
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 378 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v Japan; Austl. v. Japan) (Provisional Measures), Cases 
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 379 KLEIN, supra note 373, at 477–78. 
 380 The ICJ dispute concerning Japanese scientific research whaling took almost four years to 
resolve. See infra notes 399–416 and accompanying text. 
 381 UNCLOS, supra note 75, art. 290(1). 
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a request, the court or the tribunal has authority to prescribe an appropriate pro-
visional measure382 pending a final decision.383 If the court or the tribunal im-
poses a provisional measure, the measure is binding on all parties to the dis-
pute384 until circumstances justifying the measure have changed or ceased.385 
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, for example, the ITLOS tribunal en-
joined Japan from “authorising or conducting any further experimental fishing 
for [southern bluefin tuna] without the agreement of New Zealand and Austral-
ia.”386 In that dispute, Japan had unilaterally set itself an “experimental fishing” 
quota without the agreement of Australia or New Zealand, the two other parties 
to the CCSBT.387 The ITLOS tribunal held that Japan’s actions violated its obli-
gations under UNCLOS to cooperate with Australia and New Zealand through 
the provisions of the CCSBT.388 
C. Dispute Settlement in Other Treaties 
Although no member has invoked the dispute settlement procedure under 
the WCPF Convention, interpretive disputes have arisen under other treaties that 
might be instructive for resolving disputes under the WCPF Convention. In par-
ticular, countries have argued for different interpretations of key terms in the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (“CITES”) and the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
(“ICRW”).389 This section describes a couple disputes and identifies and analyz-
es the lessons WCPFC members can learn in settling disputes under the WCPF 
Convention. 
1. The Definition of “Whales” Under the ICRW 
The ICRW establishes the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”) to 
regulate taking of “whales,” but the ICRW never defines the term.390 Some 
countries have argued that the IWC only has the authority to regulate the taking 
of large cetaceans, although others have argued that the definition of “whales” 
                                                                                                                           
 382 Id. art. 290(3). 
 383 Id. art. 290(1). 
 384 Id. art. 290(6). 
 385 Id. art. 290(2). 
 386 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, supra note 378, ¶ 28(2). 
 387 Id. ¶ 28. 
 388 Id. ¶ 28(1). 
 389 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 
U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW] (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948). 
 390 Id. art. IV. 
396 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:347 
includes small cetaceans.391 A dispute arose in 1977 when the IWC’s Scientific 
Committee recommended that the IWC regulate the taking of bottlenose dol-
phins, beaked dolphins, pilot whales, and orcas.392 Pro-whaling countries, such 
as Japan, strongly opposed the proposal, asserting that the ICRW does not allow 
the IWC to regulate catches of small cetaceans.393 Tension between the members 
remains to this day because the IWC adopted an “ambiguous resolution” that is 
“little more than a pledge” to resolve the dispute sometime in the future.394 This 
“gentlemen’s agreement” allows the Scientific Committee to review the conser-
vation status of small cetaceans but prohibits the IWC from regulating catches of 
them.395 
The failure to resolve this dispute is one reason why some scholars and oth-
ers involved in IWC negotiations have called the IWC “dysfunctional.”396 Alt-
hough other issues contribute to that view, including the resort to the ICJ to re-
solve the issue of Japanese scientific research whaling discussed below, the dis-
pute over the meaning of “whales” is a warning signal to the WCPFC that it 
should use the strategies provided by the WCPF Convention to resolve the dis-
pute over scientific authority. As with the IWC’s concerns regarding the defini-
tion of “whales,” Japanese scientific research whaling, and the duration of the 
moratorium on commercial whaling, WCPFC members remain highly divided.  
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Without a definitive resolution to the issue of which entity has ultimate re-
sponsibility for the provision of scientific advice, the WCPFC risks becoming 
another dysfunctional institution. In fact, the World Wildlife Fund has already 
placed the WCPFC “in the lowest ranks of other dysfunctional tuna Regional 
Fisheries Management Offices . . . that have also failed to adhere to science.”397 
If, however, the WCPFC can find an “an amicable settlement”398 through concil-
iation or negotiation, it can provide a model for other international institutions to 
resolve disputes. 
2. The Scientific Research Exception Under the ICRW 
Large-scale whaling by Japan under the ICRW’s exception for scientific re-
search whaling has been the focus of criticism for years.399 In 2010, Australia 
finally turned this criticism into a legal dispute before the ICJ when it challenged 
Japan’s Antarctic whaling program, known as the Second Phase of the Japanese 
Whale Research Program Under Special Permit in the Antarctic (“JARPA II”).400 
Since the 1985–1986 whaling season,401 the IWC has imposed a moratorium on 
all commercial whaling.402 Japan, however, has been granting permits to its na-
tionals, pursuant to Article VIII of the ICRW, to kill whales for scientific re-
search purposes.403 Pursuant to this exception, Japan killed 2595 minke whales 
and fourteen fin whales in the Southern Ocean from 2005 to 2009.404 Australia, 
however, contended that this killing is for commercial purposes, not scientific 
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purposes as Japan contends.405 Australia thus alleged that Japan was in breach of 
the duty to implement its obligations under the ICRW in good faith.406 
In March 2014, the ICJ ruled that Japan’s whaling program is not per-
formed for “the purposes of scientific research.”407 The court reached this con-
clusion because Japan failed to provide, among other things, sufficient scientific 
justification for its sample size and for increasing its sample size.408 Japan also 
failed to explain to the ICJ’s satisfaction why it did not change its program, 
which was based on multi-species competition, when it decided not to hunt 
humpback whales.409 
Although adjudication in the ICJ may resolve disputes with finality, the ICJ 
process lingers for many years, as evidenced by the nearly four years it took to 
resolve the JARPA II dispute.410 The length of time for a resolution might leave 
many countries dissatisfied when the dispute involves possible ongoing, unsus-
tainable killing. The WCPFC members could overcome this problem by request-
ing provisional measures under UNCLOS, as discussed previously.411 Even pro-
visional measures, however, do not guarantee resource protection because the 
imposition of provisional measures is left to the discretion of the court or tribu-
nal hearing the dispute.412 
Moreover, frustrated private citizens may take matters into their own hands 
if they perceive that the international body is not adequately performing its du-
ties under a treaty. For example, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (“Sea 
Shepherd”) has taken direct action against whalers by confronting and interfer-
ing with whaling vessels, claiming that the IWC is not capable of enforcing the 
moratorium.413 It has expanded its efforts by launching a campaign to protect 
tuna.414 Sea Shepherd has focused its campaign on the International Commission 
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (“ICCAT”), alleging that ICCAT and the 
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European Union (EU) have failed to protect bluefin tuna.415 By voluntarily pa-
trolling in Libyan fishing zones and cutting nets of illegal tuna poachers, Sea 
Shepherd claims it took the responsibility of “what should be the business of the 
ICCAT and the EU.”416 Although extreme, this example shows that organiza-
tions like Sea Shepherd may target the WCPFC if disputes are not resolved ex-
peditiously. 
3. The Appendix II Listing Criteria Under CITES 
CITES parties and organizations have long disputed the interpretation of 
Appendix II listing criteria under CITES.417 Specifically, they disagree over the 
meaning of the word “reducing” as used in Annex 2(a)(B) of Resolution Confer-
ence 9.24, which includes the criteria for listing a species in Appendix II.418 On 
one hand, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) ar-
gues that “reducing” should have the same meaning as “decline,” which is de-
fined as “a reduction in the abundance, or area of distribution, or area of habitat 
of a species.”419 On the other hand, many CITES parties, as well as the CITES 
Secretariat, argue that “reducing” must be given its ordinary meaning (i.e. to 
make smaller) because “decline” has its own specific definition.420 Because the 
parties could not reach agreement on a common interpretation, they made the 
following compromise: when parties and organizations comment on a proposal 
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to include a species in Appendix II, they must identify on which interpretation of 
“reducing” they are basing their comments.421 
Although the compromise functions within the context of proposals to in-
clude a species in Appendix II of CITES, a similar compromise might not be 
feasible in the context of the WCPFC. Because the CITES parties ultimately vote 
if consensus cannot be reached to determine whether a species should be listed 
in Appendix II, after a consideration of comments and views presented,422 the 
use of different standards does not interfere with the ultimate process of listing a 
species. In contrast, allowing WCPFC members to choose the scientific body on 
whose advice they should rely will simply lead to stalemate if the scientific bod-
ies provide fundamentally different advice to the WCPFC. Under such circum-
stances, the members will not be able to reach consensus on a conservation and 
management measure for a stock. Therefore, the compromise that CITES parties 
resorted to cannot be applied to the WCPFC. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Article concludes that the Convention on the Conservation and Man-
agement of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western Pacific Ocean (“WCPF 
Convention” or the “Convention”) clearly provides the Scientific Committee of 
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (“WCPFC”) with the au-
thority and the duty to review the work of science providers and the WCPFC’s 
Northern Committee.423 Nonetheless, some WCPFC members believe that the 
WCPFC Convention grants the Northern Committee an autonomous role, free 
from review by the Scientific Committee.424 To eliminate the confusion concern-
ing the roles of the Scientific Committee, the Northern Committee, and the sub-
sidiary bodies of the Convention, the members should make three small, but sig-
nificant, modifications to the current arrangements governing communication 
and decision-making among these bodies. These changes will clarify that the 
Scientific Committee has authority to review scientific information and recom-
mendations of other bodies consistent with Article 12(2) of the WCPF Conven-
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tion and to ensure that such recommendations are based on the best scientific 
information available. 
1. Revise the Northern Committee’s Rules of Procedure 
WCPFC members should revise the Northern Committee’s Rules of Proce-
dure to direct the Scientific Committee to determine the best available science 
underlying the Northern Committee’s recommendations to the WCPFC. Alt-
hough the WCPF Convention already directs the Scientific Committee to review 
the scientific information presented to the WCPFC,425 the political compromises 
that led to the creation of the Northern Committee426 perhaps prevent the Scien-
tific Committee from fulfilling this duty. To allow the Northern Committee to 
utilize the best available science, the Scientific Committee must hold its annual 
meetings before the Northern Committee. This would allow the Scientific Com-
mittee to evaluate the information provided by the International Scientific 
Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean (the 
“ISC”) to the Northern Committee before the Northern Committee uses the 
ISC’s information to propose conservation and management measures (“CMMs”) 
to the WCPFC. The Northern Committee, however, currently does not have a 
required timeframe in which it holds its annual meetings. Thus, the Northern 
Committee’s Rules of Procedure should be modified to ensure that the Northern 
Committee holds its annual meetings after the Scientific Committee. In addition, 
the Rules should require the Northern Committee to explain its reasons if it rec-
ommends measures that deviate from the Scientific Committee’s recommenda-
tions. Implementing this relatively simple revision will enable both the Scientific 
Committee and the Northern Committee to fulfill their respective obligations 
under the Convention, and in addition, will enable the WCPFC to make reasoned 
decisions based on the best available scientific information.  
2. Revise the WCPFC’s MoU with the ISC 
WCPFC members should revise the WCPFC’s memorandum of under-
standing with the ISC to allow the Scientific Committee to request information 
from the ISC and to direct the Scientific Committee to review the data and rec-
ommendations that the ISC provides to the Northern Committee. For the Scien-
tific Committee to review effectively the information the ISC provides to the 
Northern Committee, the ISC should provide such information before the Scien-
tific Committee’s annual meeting. In addition, the length of time between the 
ISC providing the information and the Scientific Committee’s meeting should be 
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sufficient to allow the Scientific Committee to request additional information as 
necessary. When the Scientific Committee requests additional information, the 
request must be for information related to making the best available science de-
termination for the ISC’s recommendations to the Northern Committee or to help 
the Scientific Committee complete an analysis, assessment, or review covered 
by Article 12 of the WCPF Convention. For example, if the ISC provides the 
information to the Northern Committee two months before the Scientific Com-
mittee’s annual meeting, the Scientific Committee can determine whether it ob-
tained sufficient information to make the best available science determination. In 
the event that the Scientific Committee requires additional information, the ISC 
can provide the additionally requested data one month before the Scientific 
Committee’s annual meeting. 
3. Revise the WCPFC Resolution on Best Available Science 
WCPFC members should revise the Resolution on the Best Available Sci-
ence427 to ensure that the Scientific Committee is the ultimate authority for en-
suring that the best scientific information available is provided to the WCPFC. 
To accomplish this change, the Resolution should explicitly require the Scien-
tific Committee to review the scientific data provided by the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (the “SPC”) and the ISC. Moreover, the Resolution should 
also require the Scientific Committee to explain the underlying science and its 
reasoning if the Committee disagrees with any recommendations made by the 
SPC or the ISC. By modifying the Resolution as stated above, the Scientific 
Committee will have the authority to review the science provided by the ISC and 
SPC as required by the WCPF Convention, while maintaining transparency and 
scientific integrity. 
CONCLUSION 
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean is home to a tuna fishery valued at 
more than $3.8 billion annually, but its tuna stocks are dwindling. Perhaps un-
surprisingly, it is also now home to significant political and scientific disputes 
concerning how best to manage and conserve those valuable but dwindling re-
sources. 
These disputes are playing out in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission, or the WCPFC, the international institution charged with oversight 
of this vast fishery that covers approximately twenty percent of Earth’s surface. 
Due to political compromises made during the negotiation of the Convention on 
the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the West-
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ern Pacific Ocean, or the WCPF Convention, two subsidiary bodies were desig-
nated to provide recommendations to the WCPFC: the Scientific Committee for 
all fish stocks in the Convention Area and the Northern Committee for those 
stocks occurring mostly north of the twenty degree parallel of north latitude. 
With membership in the Northern Committee dominated by distant water fishing 
nations, many believe that the Northern Committee’s conservation and manage-
ment recommendations are inadequate to protect and restore valuable fish 
stocks, such as the Pacific bluefin tuna and the blue shark. Whereas some 
WCPFC members believe that the Scientific Committee has authority to review 
Northern Committee recommendations and that the WCPFC should rely on the 
views of the Scientific Committee, others believe that the Northern Committee is 
autonomous and that the Scientific Committee’s review of North Committee 
recommendations is unwarranted. 
This Article concludes that Article 12 of the WCPF Convention clearly au-
thorizes the Scientific Committee to review the recommendations of the North-
ern Committee and mandates that the Scientific Committee review the underly-
ing science provided to the Northern Committee by the International Scientific 
Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean (“ISC”). 
Article 12 requires the Scientific Committee to “review assessments, analyses, 
other work[,] and recommendations prepared for the [WCPFC] by . . . scientific 
experts.” It further requires the Scientific Committee to “review the results of 
research and analysis and target stocks or non-target or associated or dependent 
species in the Convention Area”; it does not limit the Scientific Committee’s 
mandate to those species south of twenty degrees parallel of north latitude. The 
Scientific Committee also has a duty to ensure that WCPFC “obtains for its con-
sideration the best scientific information available.” 
To effectuate these duties, this Article recommends that the WCPFC make 
three consequential amendments to three different documents. First, the WCPFC 
should revise the Northern Committee’s Rules of Procedure to direct the Scien-
tific Committee to determine the best available science underlying the Northern 
Committee’s recommendations to the WCPFC. Although the WCPF Convention 
already directs the Scientific Committee to review the scientific information pre-
sented to the WCPFC, the political compromises that led to the creation of the 
Northern Committee perhaps prevent the Scientific Committee from fulfilling 
this duty. 
Second, WCPFC members should revise the WCPFC’s MoU with the ISC 
to allow the Scientific Committee to request information from the ISC and to 
direct the Scientific Committee to review the data and recommendations that the 
ISC provides to the Northern Committee. As noted by one independent review, 
the Scientific Committee is often asked to review the science behind the ISC’s 
work without the relevant science because it is not able to request information 
from the ISC. Currently, only the Northern Committee may do that. 
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Third, WCPFC members should revise the Resolution on the Best Available 
Science to ensure that the Scientific Committee is the ultimate authority for en-
suring that the best scientific information available is provided to the WCPFC. 
To accomplish this change, the Resolution should explicitly require the Scien-
tific Committee to review the scientific data provided by the SPC (which pro-
vides scientific information to the Scientific Committee) and the ISC (which 
provides scientific information to the Northern Committee). The Resolution 
should also require the Scientific Committee to explain the underlying science 
and its reasoning, if the Committee disagrees with any recommendations made 
by the SPC or the ISC. By modifying the Resolution as stated above, the Scien-
tific Committee will have the authority to review the science provided by the 
ISC and SPC as required by the WCPF Convention, while maintaining transpar-
ency and scientific integrity. 
Until these changes are made, the WCPFC will continue to be divided 
among those members wishing for a more conservation-oriented approach to 
fisheries management and those members apparently more concerned about their 
commercial interests. For species such as Pacific bluefin tuna—already depleted 
to just 3.6 percent of historic biomass—and other northern stocks such as blue 
sharks, the continuing debate and the resulting dysfunction greatly hinder their 
chances of being restored to levels that would make them valuable fisheries re-
sources. 
